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4Over the last decade, laws codifying national and 
international responses to climate change have grown 
in number, specificity, and importance. As these laws 
have recognized new rights and created new duties, 
litigation seeking to challenge either their facial 
validity or their particular application has followed. 
So too has litigation aimed at pressing legislators and 
policymakers to be more ambitious and thorough 
in their approaches to climate change. In addition, 
litigation seeking to fill the gaps left by legislative and 
regulatory inaction has also continued. As a result, 
courts are adjudicating a growing number of disputes 
over actions—or inaction—related to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
This report provides judges, advocates, researchers, 
and the international community with an of-the-
moment survey of global climate change litigation, 
an overview of litigation trends, and descriptions of 
key issues that courts must resolve in the course of 
climate change cases. One purpose of this report is to 
assist judges in understanding the nature and goals of 
different types of climate change cases, issues that are 
common to these cases, and how the particularities 
of political, legal, and environmental settings factor in 
to their resolution. Another goal is to contribute to a 
common language among practitioners around the 
world working to address climate change through 
the courts.  
Part 1 describes environmental, diplomatic, and 
political circumstances that are making climate 
change litigation efforts especially important at 
the present moment:
 y Impacts such as heat waves and destructive coastal 
storms are growing in frequency and severity as 
a result of human-cause emissions. The costs to 
governments, private actors, and communities of 
dealing with these impacts are significant. 
 y National and international policymakers have 
struggled to develop effective means of addressing 
both the underlying causes and the effects of 
climate change. Climate change mitigation and 
adaptation policies have emerged slowly and have 
often set targets based on political feasibility rather 
than the consensus scientific understanding of 
what is required to stabilize the climate at an 
acceptable level. 
 y National and international policymakers have 
succeeded in creating some legal frameworks for 
climate action. Many nations have laws or policies 
addressing aspects of the climate problem, and 
the Paris Agreement provided for a catalogue of 
national commitments toward the goal of averting 
average global warming in excess of 1.5°C and 
2°C. Litigants have begun to make use of these 
codifications in arguments about the adequacy or 
inadequacy of efforts by national governments to 
protect individual rights vis-à-vis climate change 
and its impacts.
Part 2 provides a survey of climate change 
litigation and a discussion of evident and 
emerging trends:
 y Citizens and non-governmental organizations are 
suing to hold their governments accountable for 
climate-related commitments. In many instances, 
the arguments made to challenge government 
actions or inaction include reference to 
constitutional and statutory provisions not specific 
to climate change. In those cases, references to 
international climate agreements, which embody 
scientific objectives as well as political ones, often 
buttress the claim.
 y In many cases, challenges to a project or policy 
identify linkages between resource extraction 
and climate-related impacts, both in the form of 
emissions due to combustion of extracted fossil 
fuels and in the form of impairments to resiliency 
and adaptive capacity. These challenges seek to 
make those linkages legally significant and either 
deserving of consideration or else compelling 
an alternative approach to natural resource 
management.
 y Building on scientific understanding of the 
relationship between emissions and climate 
change, which policymakers (with notable 
exceptions) have generally adopted as accurate, 
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several cases seek to establish liability for entities 
that generate emissions with full knowledge of 
those emissions’ effects on the global climate.
 y Technical understanding of climate change and 
the quality of predictions about future temperature 
and weather patterns are improving. Recognizing 
that adaptation efforts have not kept pace with 
these improvements, litigants are bringing claims 
that seek to assign responsibility where failures to 
adapt result in foreseeable, material harms. 
 y Litigants are making arguments for climate action 
based on the public trust doctrine, which assigns 
the state responsibility for the integrity of a nation’s 
public trust resources for future generations. Such 
claims raise questions of individuals’ fundamental 
rights and intergenerational equity, as well as 
concerns about the balance of powers among 
the judicial, legislative and executive branches or 
functions of governments.
 y Recognizing that both slow-developing and 
acute environmental stresses push individuals and 
communities to migrate, the impacts of climate 
change are certain to generate migration within 
and across national borders. Cases brought to 
resolve issues arising from such migration have 
already been brought, and more are likely to come.
 y Most climate change litigation to date has 
proceeded in courts in developed countries in the 
northern hemisphere and in Australia and New 
Zealand. Litigants and courts in the Global South 
are beginning to make use of burgeoning climate 
change litigation theories and know how. 
Part 3 describes three categories of legal issues 
that tend to be disputed among the litigants 
involved in climate change litigation: 
 y Justiciability: Whether a case is justiciable—
meaning, whether a court has the authority to hear 
and resolve the claims raised—turns on questions 
of the plaintiff’s standing and on the court’s role 
relative to that of the government’s other branches. 
Although standards vary, courts generally only 
grant standing if the alleged causal connection 
between the injury and the action (or inaction) 
complained of is plausible. In climate change cases, 
this sometimes presents a high bar for plaintiffs. As 
for separation of powers, particularly in cases that 
call on a court to assess inaction by a government 
agency, courts must be able to articulate what 
authority empowers them to find fault or direct 
the agency to revise its approach.
 y Sources of climate obligations: Climate change 
litigation can draw on various sources of 
legal authority, including international law, 
constitutional provisions, statutes, or common law. 
In some cases, plaintiffs identify more than one 
of these, or a combination of them, as providing 
the legal basis for their claims. In instances where 
a statutory provision spells out climate change 
mitigation commitments and that statute also 
authorizes citizens to sue for noncompliance, 
the task of applying the law to the facts alleged 
is straightforward. But in cases where plaintiffs 
ask a court to apply a legal authority that does 
not expressly contemplate application to climate 
change, the task is harder and courts tread carefully, 
lest they be seen as legislating.
 y Remedies: Courts can only grant remedies 
authorized by the law. If the remedy sought is 
more aggressive climate action on the part of 
a government agency, courts must identify the 
basis for instructing that agency to comply, or else 
to specify how exactly the agency should alter its 
approach.
Summaries of highly significant cases appear 
throughout this report. Those summaries provide a 
kaleidoscopic snapshot of the current state of climate 
change litigation, and also illustrate the circumstances, 
trends, and issues discussed in Parts 1, 2 and 3.
6In the 2010s, laws codifying national and international 
responses to climate change have grown in number, 
specificity, and importance.1 As these laws have 
recognized new rights and created new duties, 
litigation seeking to challenge either their facial 
validity or their particular application has followed. 
So too has litigation aimed at pressing legislators and 
policymakers to be more ambitious and thorough 
in their approaches to climate change. In addition, 
litigation seeking to fill the gaps left by legislative 
and regulatory inaction has also continued. This 
report surveys the current state of this global climate 
change litigation, and provides judges, advocates, 
researchers and the international community with 
an overview of trends and issues in climate change 
lawsuits. 
Part 1 of this report notes the circumstances that 
make climate change litigation efforts especially 
important just now—most especially the growing 
urgency of the climate crisis, ratification and entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“Paris Agreement”), and the inclusion of climate 
action as one of the 17 Sustainable Development 
1 E. Somanathan et al., National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions, 
in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution 
of Working Group III [WG3] to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1049, 1050–51 (O.R. 
Edenhofer et al. eds. 2014) [hereinafter IPCC AR5].
Goals (SDGs) enumerated in the United Nations’ 
Transforming Our World – the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. (Climate action is also 
a vital, cross-cutting element of many of the other 
SDGs.) Part 2 provides a snapshot of the current 
state of worldwide climate change litigation. It also 
describes a number of salient current trends in this 
litigation and likely future ones. Part 3 discusses 
the recurring legal issues at play in climate change 
litigation around the world. Strict and comprehensive 
categorization is made difficult by the diversity 
of the world’s legal systems, which take varied 
approaches to the interconnected substantive areas 
of law that constitute climate change law—namely 
environmental law, natural resources law, energy 
law and land use law, as well as constitutional law, 
administrative law and common law. Nonetheless, 
this section offers legal professionals, researchers 
and others an introduction to the common issues 
that arise in climate change cases when determining 
justiciability, interpreting legal rights and obligations, 
and providing remedies. Summaries of highly 
significant cases appear throughout the report, 




71. Part 1: The Importance of Climate Change Litigation 
Concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere have already surpassed levels that many 
scientists consider safe, putting people everywhere 
in peril. The extraordinary risks posed by climate 
change are well-established. Sea levels are rising, 
making more seawater available for the storm surges 
that wreak destruction on coastlines during coastal 
storms and threatening to overwhelm coastal 
communities and small island nations.2 Average 
temperatures are rising and heat waves are growing 
longer and more intense, threatening to strain 
infrastructure and agricultural systems, and posing 
direct threats to human health.3 In addition, more 
powerful storms, longer-lasting and more severe 
droughts, and acidifying oceans have already begun 
to disrupt local and regional economies that rely on 
having predictable access to particular resources and 
markets.4 The need to address these risks is front and 
center in the Sustainable Development Goals, the 
international community’s vision for a sustainable 
future for the planet and its inhabitants. Yet, despite 
broad scientific consensus on the human causes 
2 John A. Church & Peter U. Clark, et al., Ch. 13: Sea Level Change, in IPCC 
AR5.
3 Thomas Bruckner, Igor Alexeyevich Bashmakov & Yacob Mulugetta et al., 
Ch. 7: Energy Systems, in IPCC AR5; Kirk R. Smith & Alistair Woodward, et al., 
Ch. 11: Human Health: Impacts, Adaptation, and Co-Benefits, in IPCC AR5.
4 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working 
Groups I, II and III to IPCC AR5, at 64–73 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC SR5].
of climate change and the risks of climate impacts 
to human communities, and despite the profound 
international accord forged through the Paris 
Agreement and the SDGs, progress toward effective 
solutions has been slow.
The international community has encountered 
difficulty in tackling climate change because it is a 
“super wicked” policy problem, capable of resisting 
even substantial efforts by policymakers.5 Three 
features in particular make the problem “super 
wicked.” First, it becomes less tractable over time. 
That is, the more GHGs we emit, the more committed 
we are to continuing emissions, the more severe the 
problem becomes and the less likely we are to find 
an acceptable solution. Second, the actors who are 
best positioned to address climate change are those 
who are primarily responsible for causing it—and 
who lack incentives to take action. This problem 
is made worse by an important asymmetry. Those 
with incentives not to mitigate climate change, such 
as the companies that own leases to extract coal or 
other fossil fuels, tend to have concentrated interests 
and good access to relevant information. Meanwhile, 
those most likely to bear the burdens of adaption, 
including the many millions of individuals who live 
5 Richard J. Lazarus, Super wicked problems and climate change: Restraining 
the present to liberate the future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1160 (2009).
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development
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in coastal communities, have diffuse incentives and 
generally lack information about, for instance, the 
costs and benefits of alternatives to fossil-fueled 
approaches to energy and transportation. Third, 
no institution has legal jurisdiction and authority 
aligned with the global scope of the problem. As a 
consequence, climate change mitigation—and to 
a lesser degree adaptation—efforts are often seen 
as expensive, unnecessary, futile, and remote from 
policies that yield immediate and politically popular 
economic benefits. 
At the international level, the “super wicked” nature 
of the climate change problem may be seen in 
the global community’s incomplete participation 
in the Kyoto Protocol6 and, more recently, the 
insufficiency of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) submitted in advance of the 
Paris Conference and the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) submitted after to reduce 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a pace 
sufficient to maintain climate stability.7 At the national 
level, the United States’ (U.S.) historic and recently 
revived ambivalence about addressing climate 
change stands out as an especially consequential 
example of political coalitions struggling toward 
and falling short of policy change. But the U.S. is not 
unique for failing to develop and implement policies 
that address climate change in a coherent fashion. 
Litigation has arguably never been a more 
important tool to push policymakers and market 
participants to develop and implement effective 
means of climate change mitigation and adaption 
than it is today. Technological developments and 
non-climate policy initiatives cannot be counted 
on to stave off climate destabilization. Accordingly, 
climate-related law and policy is a necessary 
6 See O. Edenhofer, et al., Technical Summary, in Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to IPCC 
AR5, at 33, 104 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds. 2014) (“The Kyoto Protocol was the 
first binding step toward implementing the principles and goals provided 
by the UNFCCC, but it has had limited effects on global GHG emissions 
because some countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not 
meet their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a portion 
of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement).”). 
7 UNFCCC, Aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined 
contributions: an update, FCCC/CP/2016/2, at 11–12 fig.2 (May 2016), 
https://perma.cc/SUW9-KXY5. 
component of any rational plan of action. The Paris 
Agreement provides a crucial legal predicate for 
pushing governments that have adopted climate-
oriented laws to implement them. Until the Paris 
Agreement’s ratification, no international instrument 
dealt as thoroughly with the coordination problem 
of international action on GHG emissions.8 
Constituents of countries outside the European 
Union (EU) could not point to an authority beyond 
their country’s particular constitution, common 
law, or statutes—or ratification of international 
human rights agreements—to place climate action 
within that country into a legally and practically 
significant context.9 The Paris Agreement makes it 
possible for constituents to articulate more precisely 
and forcefully concerns about the gaps between 
current policy and the policy needed to achieve 
mitigation and adaptation objectives. In ratifying 
countries in particular, constituents can now argue 
that their governments’ politically easy statements 
about rights and objectives must be backed up by 
politically difficult, concrete measures like restricting 
coastal development, foregoing development of 
coal-fueled power plants and imposing fees and 
taxes on activities reliant on fossil fuels. Lawsuits 
brought in countries where governments have 
given express priority to development, such as 
Pakistan,10 and in countries where governments 
are actively addressing climate change, such as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, demonstrate 
that this sometimes means using the courts to push 
for concrete action.11
Has the Paris Agreement changed the role litigation 
can play? In general, law embodies a thicket of 
agreements among the members of society and 
between them and their government. Litigation 
serves to test whether particular actions or inactions 
are compatible with those agreements. Litigation 
also serves to articulate how stated commitments 
to defend particular rights must be translated into 
8 Notably, the Paris Agreement does not address emissions from aircraft or 
marine craft.
9 See section 2.2.1 below. 
10 Pakistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, Nov. 6, 2016, 
https://perma.cc/QJH8-9EXM.
11 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below.
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action, notwithstanding changes in the direction 
of political winds at home or abroad. The Paris 
Agreement by its own terms does not provide 
litigants with a cause of action or impose enforceable 
limits on member countries’ national emissions. 
But it makes it possible for litigants to place the 
actions of their governments or private entities into 
an international climate change policy context. 
Placing actions at the national or regional level into 
that context makes it easier, in turn, to characterize 
those actions as for or against both environmental 
needs and stated political commitments. Ultimately, 
while the Paris Agreement does not assign each 
country a carbon budget, it does offer a basis for 
deducing a budget from national commitments. It 
also makes clear that policies leading to net increases 
in emissions are disfavored.
10
2.  Part 2: The State of Climate Change Litigation
This section provides a summary of the current 
state of climate change litigation, including 
lawsuits’ location, their categorization, and recent 
and emerging trends. It counts as “climate change 
litigation” cases brought before administrative, 
judicial and other investigatory bodies that raise 
issues of law or fact regarding the science of 
climate change and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts.12 Such cases are often identified 
with keywords, including climate change, global 
warming, global change, greenhouse gas, GHGs, 
and sea level rise. However, the presence of one 
or more keywords is not a necessary condition for 
inclusion.13 Moreover, the presence of keywords is 
12 Cf. Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of 
Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, 26 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y Forum 131, 134 (2015); 
(adopting definition of “climate change litigation” developed by David 
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the 
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 15, 27 
(2012): “any piece of federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial 
litigation in which the . . . tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an 
issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy of climate change 
causes and impacts.”). This definition also guides the collection of cases 
included in the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Non-U.S. Climate 
Change Litigation chart, available at https://perma.cc/8CKE-KMQU 
(accessed Mar. 3, 2017), as well as the Climate Change Laws of the World 
database, maintained jointly by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 
and the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics. 
13 For instance, the Australian case, Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council 
contained none of those terms but dealt with the highly germane issue of 
liability of a local government for decisions related to its policy of managed 
retreat from sea level rise. [2016] NSWSC 169. The court’s March 2016 
denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the Shire Council and its insurers 
prompted the parties to negotiate a settlement, which they agreed to in 
August 2016. Hans Lovejoy, How a handful of wealthy Belongil residents 
also not determinative (Cases that make only passing 
reference to the fact of climate change, its causes, 
or its effects do not necessarily address in direct or 
meaningful fashion the laws, policies, or actions that 
compel, support, or facilitate climate mitigation or 
adaptation.) Finally, cases that seek to accomplish 
climate change goals without reference to climate 
change issues are not included. For example, 
lawsuits seeking to limit air pollution from coal fired 
power plants that do not directly raise issues of fact 
or law pertaining to climate change do not qualify 
as “climate change litigation” for the purposes of 
this study. Thus, this report excludes cases where 
the discussion of climate change is incidental to 
the holding and immaterial to the future of climate 
change law. 
2.1 A survey of climate change litigation
As of March 2017 climate change cases had been 
filed in 24 countries (25 if one counts the European 
Union), with 654 cases filed in the U.S. and over 
230 cases filed in all other countries combined.14 
won the right to keep their seawalls, Echo Net Daily, Aug. 24, 2016, https://
perma.cc/HXF9-PXV5. Neither the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss 
nor the settlement agreement states whether the locality is liable for any 
of the claims alleged by the plaintiffs, beachfront property owners who 
had wanted to armor their shoreline parcels and who opposed the local 
government’s proposed policy of managed retreat.
14 To review these cases, as well as others added after March 2017, visit the 
Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer Climate Change Litigation 
databases, available at http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climate-
change-litigation/.
© Noah Rosenfield
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In regards to the non-U.S. litigation: Australia 
has seen more cases than any other non-U.S. 
country (80); the United Kingdom and the Court 
of Justice of the EU have both seen about half as 
many as Australia (49 and 40 respectively); New 
Zealand and Spain have both seen about one-
fifth as many as Australia (16 and 13 respectively); 
and there have been four or fewer cases filed in 
Austria, Belgium, Colombia, the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Micronesia, 
the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Ukraine.15 Both the number of cases in these 
countries and the number of countries where cases 
have been filed have grown in the past few years: a 
15 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Non-U.S. Climate Change Litigation: 
Non-U.S. Jurisdiction, https://perma.cc/8CKE-KMQU (accessed Mar. 3, 
2017).
Region Country Number of cases*
International Court of Justice 1 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1
Africa Nigeria 1
South Africa 1




















Latin America and Carribean Colombia 1
North America United States of America 654
Canada 13
*The numbers shown here reflect our tally of climate change cases across jurisdictions as of March 2017. It is possible that these numbers omit one or more cases 
that have already been filed or decided but have not yet come to our attention.
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survey of cases decided before 2014 found them in 
only 12 countries, including the U.S.16 Nonetheless, 
it remains true that “[m]ost countries have 
experienced little or no climate change litigation.”17
With notable exceptions18, governments are almost 
always the defendants in climate change cases.19 
Government defendants have been called upon 
to justify decisions large and small. On the large 
end of the spectrum are cases like Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Urgenda 
Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, which 
push for more aggressive national climate change 
mitigation policies, and Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and West Virginia v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, which challenge the legal bases for U.S. 
mitigation policy. On the small end of the spectrum 
are cases focused on particular projects, ranging 
from the expansion of airports and coal mines, to 
the development of renewable energy generation 
facilities, to the construction of structures on 
eroding coast lines. Whereas the cases aimed 
at large targets tend to focus their arguments 
on nationally applicable laws governing energy 
policy and air pollution, the cases aimed at smaller 
targets—which make up the clear majority of non-
U.S. cases—tend to focus on environmental impact 
assessments and other planning requirements.20 
However, several instances of strategic litigation in 
non-U.S. jurisdictions that seeks to push for more 
16  Wilensky, supra note 12, at 151–52.
17 Michael B. Gerrard & Meredith Wilensky, The role of the national courts in 
GHG emissions reductions, in Elgar Encyc. of Envtl. L. 359, 369 (Michael 
Faure ed. 2016).
18 Most exceptions are U.S. cases brought against corporations in the fossil 
fuel sector. Non-U.S. exceptions include the recent decision in Lliuya v. 
RWE AG, Az. 2 O 285/15, issued by the Regional Administrative Court of 
Essen, Germany, and the investigation of 50 firms in the fossil fuel industry 
(“Carbon Majors”) by the Human Rights Commission of the Philippines.
19 Wilensky, supra note 12, at 138–40; Markell & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 60.
20 Gerrard & Wilensky, supra note 17, at 366, 368 (“Until the issuance of an 
important and controversial decision by a Dutch court in 2015, climate 
change litigation intended to drive the course of climate change 
policies—whether to encourage their development or to halt it—was 
noticeably lacking outside of the United States.”); Wilensky, supra note 
12, at 144 (“The dominance of the EIA and Permitting Group in non-U.S. 
litigation demonstrates an emphasis on tactical suits aimed at specific 
projects. . . . In fact, strategic litigation intended to drive climate change 
policy as a whole is almost absent outside of the U.S.”); Markell & Ruhl, 
supra note 12, at 38–40.
aggressive mitigation policy have been initiated 
from 2015 to 2017.21
2.2 Trends in climate change litigation
Recent judicial decisions and court filings reveal 
several trends in regards to the purposes of climate 
change litigation. Five such trends are described 
here: holding governments to their legislative 
and policy commitments; linking the impacts 
of resource extraction to climate change and 
resilience; establishing that particular emissions are 
the proximate cause of particular adverse climate 
change impacts; establishing liability for failures (or 
efforts) to adapt to climate change; and applying the 
public trust doctrine to climate change. 
2.2.1 Holding governments to their legislative 
and policy commitments
As national governments’ political branches 
articulate commitments to climate change 
21 See infra section 2.2.1 (discussing non-U.S. cases seeking to hold 
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The Status of Climate Change Litigation 
mitigation and adaptation through legislation, 
regulation, and policy those governments’ 
administrative agencies may properly become 
subject to lawsuits seeking to enforce those 
commitments. 
The plaintiffs in Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom 
of the Netherlands brought just such a suit, 
challenging efforts by a newly elected Dutch 
Government to back away from the previous 
Government’s mitigation commitments.22 The 
Hague District Court’s June 2015 decision looked 
to the Netherlands’ international commitments, 
which did not yet include the Paris Agreement,23 
22 Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, [2015] HAZA 
C/09/00456689, appeal filed.
23 The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. UNFCCC, 
Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, https://perma.cc/5JCA-KPNR 
(accessed Jan. 15, 2017). The Netherlands is only a signatory to the 
Agreement and has not, as of this writing, ratified it. Id. The significance of 
this non-ratification is muted by the fact that the European Union, which 
negotiated at the Paris Conference on behalf of the Netherlands and other 
member states, ratified the Agreement on October 5, 2016. Id.
to construe the constitutional duty of care owed by 
the Dutch government to Dutch citizens and others, 
and concluded that the duty of care prohibits such 
backsliding.24
In September 2015, the Lahore High Court Green 
Bench issued a ruling in Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan 
that was similar in its legal basis to Urgenda, though 
it focused on adaptation rather than mitigation 
commitments.25 The court concluded that the 
government’s failure to implement the National 
Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework 
for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-
2030) “offends the fundamental rights of the citizens 
which need to be safeguarded.”26
24 Urgenda, para. 4.70.
25 Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015.
26 Id. para. 8. The court construed these rights as follows: Environment and 
its protection has taken a center stage in the scheme of our constitutional 
rights. . . Right to life, right to human dignity, right to property and right to 
information under articles 9, 14, 23 and 19A of the Constitution read with 
the constitutional values of political, economic and social justice provide 
the necessary judicial toolkit to address and monitor the Government’s 
The Netherlands
A Dutch environmental group, the Urgenda 
Foundation, and 900 Dutch citizens sued the 
Dutch government, alleging that the government’s 
recent revision of GHG emissions reduction goals 
amounted to a violation of its constitutionally 
imposed duty of care. The court in the Hague, 
agreeing with the plaintiffs, ordered the Dutch 
state to limit GHG emissions to 25% below 1990 
levels by 2020, finding the government’s existing 
pledge to reduce emissions 17% insufficient to 
meet the state’s fair contribution toward the goal, 
codified in the Paris Agreement, of keeping global 
temperature increases within 2°C of pre-industrial 
conditions. 
The court concluded that the state has a duty to 
take climate change mitigation measures due 
to the “severity of the consequences of climate 
change and the great risk of climate change 
occurring.” In reaching this conclusion, the court 
cited (without directly   applying) Article 21 of 
the Dutch Constitution; EU emissions reduction 
targets; principles under the European Convention 
on Human Rights; the “no harm” principle of 
international law; the doctrine of hazardous 
negligence; the principle of fairness, the 
precautionary principle, and the sustainability 
principle embodied in the UNFCCC; and 
the principle of a high protection level, the 
precautionary principle, and the prevention 
principle embodied in the European climate policy. 
The court did not specify how the government 
should meet the reduction mandate, but offered 
several suggestions, including emissions trading or 
tax measures. 
This decision was pathbreaking in separation 
of powers jurisprudence because it grounded 
its instruction to the government to tighten 
emissions limits on a rights-based analysis rather 
than through reference to statutory requirements. 
Subsequent petitions and judicial decisions in 
Austria, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden, all 
relating to governments’ obligations to mitigate 
climate change, have similarly been grounded at 
least in part on rights-based theories.
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To vindicate those rights, and in particular 
to require active responses to an emerging 
pattern of “heavy floods and droughts,”27 
the court ordered the executive branch to, 
among other  things, establish a Climate Change 
Commission to facilitate climate action.28
Belgium and New Zealand also saw pre-Paris 
Agreement cases filed alleging failures by their 
respective governments to adhere to stated 
national commitments. The theory of the Belgian 
case, VZW Klimatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium, 
response to climate change. Id. para. 7.
27 Id. para. 6.
28 The first of these was the designation of government officials in key 
ministries who would thereafter “work closely with the Ministry of 
Climate Change.” Id. para. 8(i). Another was identification of “adaptation 
action points,” selected from among the 734 “action items” listed in the 
Implementation Framework, that could be achieved by the end of 2015. 
Id. para. 8(ii). Finally, the court also called for the creation of a Climate 
Change Commission, whose members would include officials from key 
ministries as well as representatives of NGOs and technical experts, “to 
assist this Court to monitor the progress of the Framework.” Id. para. 8(iii).
which was still pending as of March 2017,29 
largely tracks that of the Urgenda decision. The 
New Zealand case, Thomson v. Minister for Climate 
Change Issues, challenged the adequacy of that 
country’s INDC, which the petitioner alleged fell 
short of the emissions reductions required by New 
Zealand’s Climate Change Response Act of 2002.30 
A stated purpose of the 2002 Act is to “enable 
New Zealand to meet its international obligations 
under the [UNFCCC].”31 As the petitioner explained, 
New Zealand’s INDC “equates to a reduction of 
11% below New Zealand’s 1990 emission levels by 
2030”—a mitigation effort that “will not, if adopted 
by other developed countries in combination with 
appropriate targets set by developing countries, 
stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
29 Klimaatzaak.eu, L’Affaire Climat: Le Procès, https://perma.cc/4X4D-SX8F 
(accessed Jan. 15, 2017) (reporting that the court has yet to specify a 
schedule for submission of pleadings or conduct of a hearing). Klimaatzaak 
is Dutch for “climate case.”
30 CIV-2015-__ (High Court).
31 Climate Change Response Act 2002 § 3(1)(a).
Pakistan
In September 2015, an appellate court in Pakistan 
granted the claims of Ashgar Leghari, a Pakistani 
farmer, who had sued the national and regional 
governments for failure to carry out the National 
Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework 
for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-
2030). The chief concerns of the plaintiff—and the 
court—were with the need for adaptation efforts: 
“As Pakistan is not a major contributor to global 
warming it is actually a victim of climate change and 
requires immediate remedial adaptation measures 
to cope with the disruptive climatic patterns.” 
According to the court, “the delay and lethargy of 
the State in implementing the Framework offend 
the fundamental rights of the citizens,” as codified 
in articles 9 (right to life), 14 (human dignity), 19A 
(information), and 23 (property) of the Pakistani 
constitution. 
As a remedy, the court 1) directed several 
government ministries to each nominate “a 
climate change focal person” to help ensure the 
implementation of the Framework, and to present 
a list of action points by December 31, 2015; and 2) 
created a Climate Change Commission composed 
of representatives of key ministries, NGOs, and 
technical experts to monitor the government’s 
progress. On September 14 the court issued a 
supplemental decision naming 21 individuals to 
the Commission and vesting it with various powers.
This case is an example of litigants grounding 
claims in a statutory and policy framework that 
articulates governmental responsibilities with 
respect to climate change. As the court observed, 
the responsible government ministry had spelled 
out 734 “action points” and identified 232 of those as 
deserving priority. Had the government not spelled 
out in such detail what should be done to help 
citizens deal with climate change, it would have 
been more difficult for the court to conclude that 
the government’s failure to implement applicable 
law and policy fell short of protecting Leghari’s 
constitutional rights.
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level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”32 The High 
Court of New Zealand had as of March 2017 yet to 
issue a judgment in that case.
The Paris Agreement is emerging as a novel and 
unique anchorage for law suits of this sort. That 
Agreement integrates national commitments—the 
INDCs/NDCs—into an international instrument that 
links them to the  common goal of averting  warming 
in excess of 1.5°C and 2°Ctemperature thresholds.33 
This linkage does not answer technical questions 
about how to allocate carbon budgets, but it does 
give some shape to national commitments, even 
if those commitments are vaguely worded. It also 
undermines arguments that increments of difference 
in one nation’s contributions are immaterial to 
global mitigation and so are not legally cognizable.34 
Furthermore, although the Paris Agreement does 
not prescribe particular national commitments, 
it does expressly call on national governments 
to make their mitigation commitments 
incrementally more stringent and never less so.35 
Thus, even if a national government can argue that 
it never specified a level of emissions reduction 
it cannot argue that its commitments permit 
backsliding. 
A petition filed in Switzerland in October 2016 
makes constitutional arguments akin to those made 
in Urgenda,36 but buttresses them with reference 
to the Paris Agreement. As the petitioners in Union 
of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection v. Swiss 
Federal Council explain: “[w]ith the Paris Agreement 
the parties [to the UNFCCC] defined anew the 
32 Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues at paras. 85, 90.
33 Conference of the Parties Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, art. 3 para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement] (Dec. 12, 2015) 
(specifying temperature thresholds basic to Agreement’s objectives), 
id. art. 3 para. 3 (parties shall undertake increasingly stringent nationally 
determined contributions to mitigation).
34 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 561 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
35 Paris Agreement, art. 3 para. 3.
36 Specifically, the Swiss petitioners ground their claims in articles 10 (right 
to life), 73 (sustainability principle), and 74 (precautionary principle) of the 
Swiss Constitution, and in articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which Switzerland has ratified. Union of Swiss Senior Women 
for Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Council [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen 
Schweiz v. Bundesrat], at para. 1(a) (filed Oct. 25, 2016), https://perma.
cc/3LGB-3V7H.
goal of preventing ‘dangerous disruption of the 
climate system’” by stipulating warming thresholds 
of 1.5°C and 2°C above preindustrial levels.37 
Taking this as the scientifically and legally 
stipulated touchstone for Switzerland (and 
others), the petitioners allege that Switzerland 
is not on pace to meet its commitment, and 
that—unlike Swiss compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol, which relied heavily on the purchase 
of emissions offsets—physically and legally 
adequate mitigation measures require actually 
reducing net emissions from Swiss sources.38 
Petitioners in three other European cases, one 
dealing with the expansion of Vienna’s airport (the 
“Austrian case”), Greenpeace Nordic Association v. 
Norway Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and PUSH 
Sweden v. Government of Sweden, also assert that 
their respective governments’ legal commitments 
to climate change mitigation are consistent with 
and articulated through ratification of the Paris 
Agreement.39 
In the Austrian case, petitioners persuaded the 
court that authorizing expansion of the Vienna 
37 See id. para. 60 (“Mit dem Übereinkommen von Paris haben die 
Vertragsstaaten im Dezember 2015 das Ziel, eine «gefährliche Störung 
des Klimasystems» zu verhindern, neu definiert. So soll die globale 
durchschnittliche Erwärmung der Erdatmosphäre im Vergleich zur 
vorindustriellen Zeit auf «deutlich unter 2 Grad Celsius» gehalten werden. 
Es sollen Anstrengungen unternommen werden, die Erwärmung auf 1.5 
Grad zu begrenzen (Art. 2 Abs. 1 Bst. a Pariser Übereinkommen).”).
38 Id. § 4.3.2 (“[Insufficient measures for the achievement of applicable 
reduction goals for 2020”] Ungenügende Massnahmen zur Erreichung des 
geltenden Reduktionsziels für 2020.”).
39 Norway ratified the Paris Agreement on June 20, 2016, Sweden on October 
13, 2016. UNFCCC, Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, supra note 23. 
On the legal relevance of the Paris Agreement to national commitments, 
the Norwegian petition states: “The presumption principle, which calls for 
Norwegian law to be interpreted in accordance with international law, 
makes international law rules and fundamental principles of international 
law a part of our national legal system. This means that the Climate 
Convention, the Paris Agreement and international human rights and 
environmental principles are relevant sources of law when the limitations 
in Article 112 of the Constitution are to be determined.” Greenpeace Nordic 
Ass’n at 36. On the same point, the Swedish petition states: “98. By signing 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the State has explicitly accepted a duty 
of care. In order to fulfil this duty, every individual State must to the highest 
extent possible, in accordance with its own circumstances, implement the 
best possible measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. * * * 102. 
The Swedish climate targets and Sweden’s accession to international 
agreements are relevant to the interpretation of these directives. * * 
* 110. The scope of the duty of care is determined by a combination of 
factors such as Sweden’s accession to international conventions, nationally 
adopted environmental goals, environmental legislation, government 
statements, etc.”). PUSH Sweden at paras. 98, 102, 110.
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airport would run afoul of the emissions reductions 
targets set forth in Austria’s Climate Protection Law 
and contradict Austria’s climate change mitigation 
commitments under the Paris Agreement.40 In the 
Norwegian petition, the challenged action is issuance 
of licenses for deep-sea oil and gas extraction in the 
Barents Sea. In the Swedish petition, the challenged 
action is the sale (rather than decommissioning) of 
coal mines and coal-fired power plants in Germany 
by Vattenfall, a state-owned energy company. For 
all three groups of petitioners, the Paris Agreement 
provides a scientific reference point as well as a 
legally definitive constraint.41
2.2.2 Linking the impacts of resource extraction 
to climate change and resilience
Any thorough catalogue of the activities that result 
in GHG emissions or reduce communities’ resilience 
to extreme weather events must include resource 
extraction.42 Mining for coal and other combustible 
40 Austrian Federal Administrative Court case no. W109 2000179-1/291E, 
https://perma.cc/6P34-5HYU.
41 Greenpeace Nordic Ass’n at 18–19 (“The Paris Agreement will enter into force 
on 4 November 2016. The Agreement will then constitute an international 
law obligation for Norway. . . . In addition to its legal content, the Paris 
Agreement and the decision document for the Agreement represent a 
factual basis in the case.”); PUSH Sweden at 26 (quoting 2014 Statement of 
Government Policy regarding emissions reduction goals and upcoming 
Paris Conference), 33 (quoting June 2016 statement of Environmental 
Objectives Council regarding needed emissions reductions).
42 At issue in the case were Law No. 1450 of 2011, establishing the National 
Development Plan 2010–2014, and Law No. 1753 of 2015, establishing 
energy sources and drilling for oil and gas yield fossil 
fuels, the consumption of which emits the GHGs 
responsible for climate change. Mining and drilling 
also tend to generate large volumes of pollution 
in their immediate vicinity, impairing local water 
resources’ quality or quantity or both. Recognizing 
this, plaintiffs eager for policy to address climate 
change have begun to challenge environmental 
review and permitting processes that unduly ignore 
resource extraction activities’ implications for the 
climate.
In February 2016 the Constitutional Court in 
Colombia held two statutory provisions to be 
unconstitutional, preventing regulatory authorities 
from ignoring the climate-related costs of resource 
extraction. One provision authorized a national 
commission to designate particular projects 
as being in the national strategic interest—a 
designation that would exempt projects 
from aspects of local regulatory oversight.43 
The other provision is grandfathered in leases 
and permits for mining and oil and gas in 
sensitive mountain ecosystems (páramos).44 
The Colombian court found the provisions 
unconstitutional because they endangered the 
the National Development Plan 2014–2018. The two provisions discussed 
here both appeared in the latter.
43 Law No. 1753 of 2015 arts. 49–52.
44 Id. art. 173.
Austria
Various NGOs and individuals persuaded a panel 
of the Austrian Federal Administrative Court 
to overturn the government of Lower Austria’s 
approval of construction of a third runway at 
Vienna’s main airport. The reason: authorizing 
the runway would do more harm to the public 
interest than good, primarily because it would 
be contrary to Austria’s national and international 
obligations to mitigate the causes of climate 
change. Of the authorities cited by the court, the 
most important was Austria’s Climate Protection 
Act of 2011, which set emissions reduction targets 
for various sectors, including the transport sector. 
Because a third runway was expected to increase 
Austria’s annual CO2 emissions, the court concluded 
that it would be at odds with the provisions of the 
2011 Act as well as with Austria’s constitution and 
its international commitments under EU law and 
the Paris Agreement.
This case is the first instance of a court determining 
that climate change mitigation commitments 
require it to overturn government agency 
approval of infrastructure development. It is thus a 
leading example both of a court straightforwardly 
enforcing a climate mitigation statute and of a 
court vindicating rights to environmental integrity.
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public’s right to clean water, and they abrogated 
government agencies’ obligation to justify 
decisions that would result in the degradation 
of environmentally sensitive and valuable areas. 
Crucially, the court characterized páramos as 
valuable both for providing Colombia with much 
of its drinking water and because their soils and 
vegetation capture CO2 from the atmosphere at 
greater rates than a tropical rainforest with similar 
acreage.45
In Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, the petitioner has 
challenged various government actions and 
inactions relating to approval of development of the 
Thar coal field, which is expected to produce 4.5 to 
60 million metric tons of coal annually.46 According 
to the petitioner, because of the local environmental 
degradation, displacement, and coal-fed GHG 
emissions that will result from that development, 
its approval amounts to a three-fold violation: of 
constitutionally protected “Fundamental Rights”; of 
rights relating to the environmental degradation 
expected to result from burning coal to generate 
45 Constitutional Court, Feb. 8, 2016, Decision C-035/16, at para. 142.
46 Ali v. Pakistan, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of 2016, at para. xxvi, 
https://perma.cc/6AFA-2ZL5; see also Muhammad Imran Rashid et al., Coal 
as an Energy Source for Mitigating Energy Crisis in Pakistan, 4 J. ENG. & 
TECH. 127, 128–29 (July-Dec. 2014), https://perma.cc/66NK-GZH6.
electricity; and of the public trust doctrine as it 
relates to Pakistan’s atmosphere and climate. The 
Lahore High Court had as of March 2017 not yet 
issued a judgment in that case.
The petition in Greenpeace Nordic Association v. 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy similarly argues 
that the Norwegian Ministry’s lease of blocks of 
the Barents Sea to oil and gas developers violates 
constitutional protections. Article 112 of Norway’s 
constitution provides that Norwegians have a “right 
to an environment that is conducive to health and 
to a natural environment whose productivity and 
diversity are maintained.” Petitioners allege that 
maintenance of that environment requires staying 
within a global emissions budget consistent with 
the 1.5°C or 2°C warming thresholds recognized by 
the Paris Agreement, and that the Barents Sea leases 
would allow for the extraction of fossil fuels and 
related emission of GHGs in excess of that budget. 
That case was also still pending in March 2017.
2.2.3 Establishing that particular emissions are 
the proximate cause of particular adverse 
climate change impacts
Although several courts have recognized the 
scientific consensus regarding the causal relationship 
Colombia
In Decision C-035/16 of February 8, 2016, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court struck down as 
unconstitutional provisions of Law No. 1450 of 2011 
and of Law No. 1753 of 2015 that threatened high-
altitude ecosystems, called páramos. The court noted 
several important features of páramos, including 
their fragility, their lack of regulatory protection, 
their role in providing Colombia with as much as 
70 percent of its drinking water, and the capacity of 
their soils and vegetation to capture CO2 from the 
atmosphere. 
The court highlighted the last of these features in 
particular, calling páramos a “carbon capture system” 
and explaining that the carbon capture capacity of 
páramos exceeds that of a comparably sized
 
tropical rainforest. The court decided that statutory 
provisions that would have allowed for development 
in the páramos were unconstitutional because they 
would endanger the public’s right to clean water and 
relieve government agencies of their obligation to 
justify decisions certain to result in the degradation 
of environmentally sensitive and valuable areas.
The court framed its protection of rights in this 
decision as responsive to climatic changes that 
would make resources like the water flowing from 
páramos even more valuable in the future. It can 
thus be read as taking the need for adaptation to 
climate change into account when interpreting the 
significance of constitutionally protected rights that 
do not explicitly reference climate change.
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between anthropogenic GHG emissions, climate 
change, and the adverse impacts resulting from 
climate change,47 no court has yet found that 
particular GHG emissions relate causally to particular 
adverse climate change impacts for the purpose of 
establishing liability. Indeed, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change describes the key 
causal mechanism of climate change as “well-
mixed greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere.48 
Such mixing obscures particular contributions 
and makes attribution of harm difficult. Yet the 
law generally assigns liability only when particular 
contributions can be related to particular effects. 
Plaintiffs in the U.S. and Germany have sought—
unsuccessfully, so far—to establish that particular 
47 See, e.g., Urgenda at para. 4.14; Mass. v. EPA at 498; Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 132 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 U.S. 2427 (2014); and Greenpeace New Zealand 
v. Northland Regional Council, [2007] NZRMA 87, at para. 7.
48 IPCC AR5, WG1 § 6.3.
emitters have proximately caused them particular 
injuries. The leading U.S. cases are Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power and Kivalina v. ExxonMobil. 
The Connecticut plaintiffs sought an injunction 
capping emissions from power plants;49 
the Kivalina plaintiffs sought damages for 
their injuries from fossil fuel companies;50 
 both sets of plaintiffs grounded their claims against 
private companies in a theory of public nuisance 
under federal common law. In both cases the 
courts concluded that the federal Clean Air Act had 
displaced federal common law claims, and so did not 
reach the substantive question of proximate cause.51
49 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
50 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
51 Connecticut, 564 U.S. at 415 (“The Clean Air Act and the Environmental 
Protection Agency action the Act authorizes, we hold, displace the 
claims the plaintiffs seek to pursue.”); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 (“We need 
not engage in that complex issue and fact-specific analysis in this case, 
because we have direct Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court 
has already determined that Congress has directly addressed the issue 
of domestic greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources and 
Norway
In  Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature 
& Youth v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
two environmental NGOs filed suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment from the Oslo District Court 
that Norway’s Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
violated the Norwegian constitution by issuing a 
block of oil and gas licenses for deep-sea extraction 
from sites in the Barents Sea. 
The petition alleges several key facts: the licenses 
would allow access to as-yet undeveloped fossil fuel 
deposits in a manner inconsistent with the climate 
change mitigation required to avert global warming 
of 1.5°C and possibly even 2°C in excess of pre-
industrial levels; and the area made accessible by the 
licenses would be the northernmost yet developed, 
and would border the ice zone, presenting 
extraordinary risks to the highly sensitive Arctic 
environment from potential spills and emissions of 
black carbon. The petition also alleges violation of 
article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution, which 
establishes a “right to an environment that is 
conducive to health and to a natural environment 
whose productivity and diversity are maintained.” 
The petition also cites other constitutional 
provisions including those requiring government 
action to be consistent with the precautionary 
principle; the no harm principle as it applies both 
domestically and to citizens of other countries; 
and human rights protections. In addition to these 
national sources of legal authority, the petition also 
points out that Norway’s issuance of oil and gas 
licenses contradicts its commitments under the 
Paris Agreement.
Much as the Urgenda plaintiffs used national 
and international commitments to construe the 
climate mitigation implications of the duty of 
care embodied in the Dutch constitution, this 
petition argues for a similar interpretation of the 
right to environmental integrity protected by 
the Norwegian constitution. It would have been 
possible to make a similar argument before Norway 
ratified the Paris Agreement and that Agreement 
entered into force, but those events lend specificity 
and context to the constitutional right at the core 
of the petition.
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In Lliuya v. RWE AG, Saul Lliuya, a Peruvian farmer, 
filed suit in a German court against a German 
utility. Lliuya sought damages to offset the costs 
of protecting his town from melting glaciers, for 
which he alleged RWE is partly responsible.52 
Two of the several reasons stated by the court for 
dismissing Lliuya’s claim went to causation. The first 
reason was evidentiary: the plaintiff had asked the 
court to specify RWE’s precise annual contribution to 
global emissions rather than submitting an estimate. 
The second reason was more emblematic: the court 
found that no “linear causal chain” linked the alleged 
injury and RWE’s emissions—rather many emitters 
had created the risk of flood confronting Lliuya’s 
town such that the root cause of the risk could not 
be ascribed to RWE in particular.53
has therefore displaced federal common law. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. 
at 2530, 2537.”). The closest courts have come to such an answer have 
been decisions about standing, for which the bar is lower than “tort-like 
causation.” See Mass v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
582 F.3d 309, 346 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); 
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 865 (5th Cir. 2009).
52 Az. 2 O 285/15 Essen Regional Court [2015].
53 [David Loses the Fight Against Goliath], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
In Greenpeace Southeast Asia et al., 
environmentalists and Filipino citizens filed a 
petition with the Philippine Commission on 
Human Rights, a tribunal empowered to investigate 
allegations and issue recommendations but 
not to issue orders that carry the force of law.54 
The petitioners submitted factual allegations 
that identify  50  corporations as “Carbon Majors,” 
responsible for a cumulative 21.71% of the 
anthropogenic GHGs emitted from 1751 to 2010.55 The 
petitioners also characterize the relationship between 
climate change, ocean acidification, and potential 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/LX3R-7SVE ([“A flood risk would 
however not be attributed singly to RWE AG.”] “Eine Flutgefahr wäre 
jedoch der RWE AG nicht individuell zuzuordnen.”).
54 Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Human Rights, 
http://198.23.173.74/chr/ (accessed Mar. 4, 2017); Greenpeace Southeast 
Asia and Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Petition To the 
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines Requesting for Investigation 
of the Responsibility of the Carbon Majors for Human Rights Violations 
or Threats of Violations Resulting from the Impacts of Climate Change 
[hereinafter Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia], https://perma.cc/2S8R-
TTKN.
55 Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia at 3–4 (citing R. Heede, Carbon Majors: 
Accounting for Carbon and Methane Emissions 1854-2010, Methods and 
Results Report (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/CVY4-YANG).
Germany (and Peru) 
In November 2015, Saúl Luciano Lliuya, a Peruvian 
farmer who lives in Huaraz, Peru, filed a claim for 
damages in a German court against RWE, Germany’s 
largest electricity producer. 
Lliuya’s suit alleges that RWE, having knowingly 
contributed to climate change by emitting 
substantial volumes of GHGs, bears some measure 
of responsibility for the melting of mountain glaciers 
near Huaraz, population 120,000. That melting has 
given rise to an acute threat: Palcacocha, a glacial 
lake located above Huaraz, has experienced a 30-
fold volumetric increase since 1975 and a four-
fold increase since 2003. Lliuya based his claim on 
paragraph 1004 of the German Civil Code, which 
provides for nuisance abatement and injunctive 
relief. He asked the court to declare that RWE 
was partly responsible for the costs arising from 
the lake’s growth. He also asked the court to 
order RWE to reimburse him for measures he had 
already taken to protect his home and to provide 
a Huaraz community association with €17,000 for 
the purpose of building siphons, drains, and dams 
to protect the town. That amount is 0.47 percent of 
both (1) the estimated cost of protective measures; 
and (2) RWE’s estimated annual contribution to 
global GHG emissions. 
The court dismissed Lliuya’s requests for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, as well as his request for 
damages. The court noted several grounds for its 
decision, but none was more important than its 
finding that no “linear causal chain” linked RWE’s 
emissions to the dangers and costs described by 
Lliuya as resulting from melting glaciers. This legal 
conclusion goes a step beyond what any other 
court, including the U.S. courts that decided the 
AEP v. Connecticut and Village of Kivalina cases, has 
stated on the question of whether a given entity’s 
emissions can be said to have proximately caused 
injury via impacts of climate change.
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physical and economic harms facing Filipinos.56 
Based on these facts and arguments grounded 
in international human rights law, the petitioners 
requested that the Commission “[c]onduct an 
investigation into the human rights implications 
of climate change and ocean acidification and 
the resulting rights violations in the Philippines, 
and whether the investor-owned Carbon 
Majors have breached their responsibilities 
to respect the rights of the Filipino people.”57 
In December 2015 the Commission agreed to 
undertake an investigation, which was in progress 
as of March 2017.58
In addition to arguing that climate change-related 
injuries are proximately caused by particular 
emitters, the parties seeking relief in each of these 
cases have proposed various ways for tribunals to 
apportion responsibility for those injuries among 
named defendants and others. The proposals all 
resemble the “market share” theory of how to allocate 
damages fairly in product liability cases in the U.S.,59 
 a theory that, notably, has seldom been implemented 
successfully. So far, however, no court or tribunal has 
endorsed or suggested any approach to establishing 
and defining proximate causation in this context. 
2.2.4 Establishing liability for failure to adapt 
and the impacts of adaptation
As the impacts of climate change have grown in 
frequency and severity, plaintiffs have sought redress 
for decisions that arguably amplified those impacts 
56 Id. at 13–17.
57 Id. at 30. The petition’s prayer also includes five subsidiary requests, but, 
as the petition itself states, “At the heart of this petition is the question 
of whether or not the Respondent Carbon Majors must be held 
accountable—being the largest corporate contributors of greenhouse 
gases emissions and having so far failed to curb those emissions despite 
the companies’ knowledge of the harm caused, capacity to do so, and 
potential involvement in activities that may be undermining climate 
action—for the human rights implications of climate change and ocean 
acidification.” Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
58 Greenpeace International, First national human rights investigation into 
climate change impacts proceeds despite opposition from fossil fuel 
companies, Dec. 8, 2016, https://perma.cc/DDJ3-4UY8.
59 See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) (apportioning 
liability to manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol, a synthetic form of estrogen 
prescribed to pregnant women to prevent miscarriage, because it was 
determined to have caused plaintiff’s cancer but it was impossible to 
determine which manufacturer had produced the particular doses that 
her mother took while pregnant with her).
or failed to avert foreseeable harms caused by them. 
Meanwhile, government-led adaptation measures 
have also inspired plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief 
or compensation for alleged injury to their property 
rights. The following examples from the U.S. and 
Australia illustrate each of these types of adaptation-
related case. 
In the U.S. the scope of local, state, and national 
governments’ sovereign immunity plays a key role 
in cases dealing with liability for failure to adapt. 60 
Two sets of consolidated cases brought in 2005 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrate 
this point: In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,61 
and St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States.62 
Both focused on the role of the Mississippi River Gulf 
Outlet (MRGO) shipping channel in propagating 
the hurricane’s storm surge into the city of New 
Orleans. Since the Army Corps of Engineers finished 
excavating MRGO in 1968, natural wave action, 
storms, and the wakes of large ships had caused it 
to widen from 500 feet to nearly 2000 feet, such that 
by 2005 its banks sat close to levées built to protect 
New Orleans neighborhoods from flooding. As with 
many cases focused on adaptation, climate change 
featured in the background rather than the text of 
these cases: A changing climate forces decisions by 
public and private actors about how to deal with 
shifting shorelines and more frequent and powerful 
coastal storms, and it creates uncertainties by pulling 
coastlines and weather patterns away from their 
historical norms.
In these cases plaintiffs sought damages 
for the effects of the Katrina storm surge 
propagated via MRGO into New Orleans under 
two distinct theories: that the Corps had been 
negligent, and that the Corps’ management 
of the channel had effectuated a temporary 
uncompensated taking of property damaged in 
60 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Jennifer Klein, Potential Liability of 
Governments for Failure to Prepare for Climate Change (Aug. 2015), http://
bit.ly/2jtwRyK.
61 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
62 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015). The Army Corps of Engineers has appealed 
this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. St. Bernard Parish 
Government et al. v. United States, Case No. 16-2301 (Fed. Cir.).
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the storm, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.63 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
negligence claim in In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 
finding that the waiver of sovereign immunity 
provided for by Federal Tort Claims Act did not 
extend to the Corps’ management of the MRGO.64 
In St. Bernard Parish Government the Federal Court 
of Claims accepted that MRGO’s management had 
effectuated a temporary taking, a claim to which 
sovereign immunity does not apply. 
The terms “climate change” and “sea level rise” 
also do not appear in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss 
in Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council.65 
Yet, the case arose from the Shire Council’s struggle 
to decide what to do about the local effects of sea 
level rise. Specifically, over the course of several 
years, the Council initially proposed a policy of 
managed retreat, then withdrew the proposal but 
did not formally repudiate it. Meanwhile, residents 
were prohibited from armoring their stretches of 
shoreline, even though hard shoreline armoring 
installed by the Council in the 1960s and 70s was 
amplifying erosion on their stretches. These residents 
sued to challenge various aspects of the Council’s 
land use plans, demanding compensation as well 
as authorization to install rock, concrete, and rubble 
shoreline barriers to prevent further erosion. After 
the court denied the Council’s motion to dismiss 
the residents’ claims, the parties settled, leaving 
unresolved the question of whether the Council was 
liable for the effects of the armoring it had installed 
or of its proposed policy of managed retreat.
Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil, 
recently filed in the federal district court in Boston, 
Massachusetts, is a national and international test 
case for the theory that plaintiffs can prevail on 
claims arising from the threat of potential injury 
63 These theories were not only distinct but also mutually exclusive: whereas 
federal district courts had jurisdiction over the first, only the Court of 
Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the second. Thus a plaintiff could not 
present both even by arguing one in the alternative.
64 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d at 441, cert. denied sub nom., 
Lattimore v. U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
65 [2016] NSWSC 169.
attributable to a failure to adapt to climate change.66 
The plaintiffs in that case summarize their chief 
concerns about a petroleum products distribution 
and bulk storage terminal owned and operated by 
ExxonMobil in this way: 
“ExxonMobil’s failure to adapt the Everett 
Terminal to increased precipitation, rising sea 
levels and storm surges of increasing frequency 
and magnitude puts the facility, the public 
health, and the environment at great risk because 
a significant storm surge, rise in sea level, and/
or extreme rainfall event may flood the facility 
and release solid and hazardous wastes into the 
Island End River, Mystic River, and directly onto 
the city streets of Everett.” 67
A decision for the plaintiffs in this case would 
create a blueprint for others to follow, identifying 
facilities where statutory violations can be used as 
leverage to compel adaptation to risks arising from 
climate change impacts. Because coastal terminals 
like the one in Everett are a commonplace, and 
indispensable for the distribution of petroleum 
products and natural gas, such a blueprint would 
be highly significant and almost certainly generative 
of a small wave of litigation. Furthermore, because 
private facility owners—unlike governments—lack 
the shield of sovereign immunity, fewer legal options 
would help them to avoid investing in adaptation 
measures.
2.2.5 Applying the public trust doctrine to 
climate change
The public trust doctrine is a widely recognized 
common law duty on the sovereign of a given 
jurisdiction to act as trustee for present and 
future generations by maintaining the integrity 
of the public trust resources in that jurisdiction.68 
66 Complaint, paras. 70–88, Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-11950 (D. Mass.), https://perma.cc/P55L-9T9Q. The 
plaintiffs also allege violations of the Clean Water Act that do not hinge on 
the effects of climate change. Id. paras. 194–96, 200–02, 210.
67 Id. para. 183.
68 See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public 
Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches 
to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2011-2012) 
(surveying applications of doctrine in Asia, Africa, and South America); 
see also Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub 
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 Arguments that the doctrine compels government-
led or -supported climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts have appeared in Ukraine, the 
Philippines, Pakistan, and multiple U.S. state and 
federal courts. 
Plaintiffs seeking application of the doctrine 
to climate change mitigation in Ukraine, the 
Philippines, and Pakistan have met with modest 
success. In Environmental People Law v. Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine a Ukrainian court addressed the 
question of whether the Ukrainian government 
had a constitutional responsibility to regulate 
“air” as a natural resource “on behalf of and for 
the people of Ukraine.”69 Though the court held 
that the government did have such a duty, 
it did not direct the government to do more 
than report on its progress toward compliance 
with its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.70 
In the Philippines, a petition for an extraordinary 
writ from the Supreme Court identified the 
public trust doctrine as one of the bases for its 
nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (“traditionally, the doctrine has functioned 
as a restraint on the states’ ability to alienate submerged lands in favor of 
public access to and enjoyment of the waters above those lands.”).
69 Environmental People Law v. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Kyiv Dist. Admin. 
Ct. 2011).
70 Id.
request that the government help to mitigate 
climate change by curtailing motorized vehicle 
traffic and enabling bicycle and foot traffic.71 
The petitioner in the case of Ali v. Pakistan also cites 
the public trust doctrine as a legal basis for her 
claims against governmental approval of coal fields 
in the Thar Desert because of the foreseeable direct 
and indirect environmental degradation that will 
ensue.72
In the U.S. various groups of plaintiffs organized by 
Our Children’s Trust have argued before multiple 
administrative bodies and courts of law that the public 
trust doctrine compels state or federal government 
action on climate change. There is general consensus 
among courts that the proposed application of the 
doctrine “represents a significant departure from 
the doctrine as it has been traditionally applied,”73 
but disagreement on several key issues persists. 
One point of disagreement is whether the 
public trust doctrine sounds in federal law at 
71 Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus, Segovia v. 
Climate Change Commission, Special Civil Action No. __, at 23 (S.C. Feb. 17, 
2014), https://perma.cc/W7XD-L8HH (“the Trustee—the person or entity 
given the trust, i.e. the Government, is duty-bound to properly care for and 
manage the thing held in trust – the life-sources of Land, Air and Water for 
the people.”).
72 Ali, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of 2016.
73 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
U.S. (Juliana v. United States) 
Twenty-one youth plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal 
district court against the U.S. government, asking 
the court to compel the government to take action 
to reduce CO2 emissions so that atmospheric CO2 
concentrations will be no greater than 350 parts 
per million by 2100.  The plaintiffs alleged that 
the “nation’s climate system” was critical to their 
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property, 
and that the defendants had violated their 
substantive due process rights by allowing fossil 
fuel production, consumption, and combustion at 
“dangerous levels.” The plaintiffs also alleged that 
the government’s failure to control CO2 emissions 
constituted a violation of their constitutional right 
to equal protection before the law, as they were 
being denied the fundamental rights afforded to 
prior and present generations. Finally, the plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants had failed to fulfill their 
obligations under the public trust doctrine. 
This decision contains a novel application of the 
public trust doctrine—one that may be overturned 
on appeal, but is consistent with an international 
groundswell of cases in which litigants have 
implicated that doctrine in their challenges to 
inadequate government climate change mitigation 
or adaptation efforts. At least one court has already 
referred to it in support of a decision to invite 
plaintiffs to amend their claims to include one 
resembling those argued in Juliana.
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all, or only in state law.74 Another is whether the 
public trust doctrine extends to the atmosphere, 
or whether obligations derive from climate 
impacts on ocean and coastal resources.75 
A third arises from the question of what—assuming 
the doctrine does apply to climate change—
the proper role of the courts is in relation to the 
legislature and executive.76
2.3 Emerging trends in climate change litigation
Two further trends seem likely to emerge in the 
coming years: a growing number of cases dealing 
with migrants seeking temporary or permanent 
relocation from their home countries or regions 
owing at least in part to climate change; and more 
climate change litigation in the Global South.
2.3.1 “Climate refugees”
The term “climate refugee” is occasionally used in news 
reports and advocacy documents, but it is difficult 
to apply it usefully in a legal or practical sense.77 
 The prevailing legal definition of refugee, established 
by the U.N. Refugee Convention, excludes migrants 
displaced solely by changes to their environment.78 
The term may even be misleading, as it implies that 
displacement caused by climate change is or will be 
74 Compare PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012), and Alec 
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) with Juliana v. 
United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146, at *23 (D. Or. Nov. 
10, 2016).
75 See Chernaik, v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229, at *6–8 (Or. Cir. 
Ct. 2015); Foster v. Wash. Dep’t  of Ecol., No. 14-2-25295-1, 2015 WL 7721362, 
at *4 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015); Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 
350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
76 See e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014); Funk v. Wolf, 
144 A.3d 228, 252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (“mandamus will not lie because 
Petitioners lack a clear right to performance of requested activities, and 
that declaratory relief would serve no practical purpose.”).
77 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 196–200 (2013) (examining critically proposed 
legal definitions); Jane McAdam, Why a Climate Change Displacement 
Treaty Is Not the Answer, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 2, 13 (2011) (“From a 
policy perspective, it would seem to be both practically impossible and 
conceptually arbitrary to attempt to differentiate between those displaced 
people who deserve ‘protection’ on account of climate change, and those 
who are victims of ‘mere’ economic of environmental hardship.”).
78 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 33(1), 
opened for signature July 28, 1981, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also Jane McAdam 
& Ben Saul, An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced 
Displacement and International Law, in Human Security and Non-Citizens: 
Law, Policy and International Affairs 357 (Alice Edwards & Carla Ferstman 
eds. 2010).
predominantly international rather than domestic.79 
Nonetheless, the term does convey that climate-
driven displacement is in the offing, and does so 
in a way that highlights the lack of an existing 
legal framework capable of dealing with that 
displacement.
A handful of cases in Australia and New Zealand 
offer a partial preview of how “climate refugees” 
will feature in climate change litigation.80 But the 
discussion in those cases of whether climate change 
impacts provide legally sufficient cause to authorize 
immigration does not presage the full scope of what 
we can expect to see as climate change-related 
pressures drive rates of intra- and international 
migration higher in the coming years and decades. 
“Climate refugee” litigation is also likely to arise over 
internal disaster recovery and resettlement efforts, 
international efforts to facilitate or directly support 
resettlement within or outside a country of origin, 
and access to resources within and across national 
borders amid shifting populations and changing 
climates.
2.3.2 More litigation in the Global South
Several factors suggest that climate change litigation 
will appear with increasing frequency in the Global 
South. In many instances, this appearance may 
owe simply to the steady proliferation of laws 
and financial resources focused on mitigation, 
adaptation, and sustainable development more 
generally. In others, climate change litigation may 
79 Most migration triggered by environmental change occurs within 
national borders. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Forced 
Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States 
Under International Law, Submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA 6), at 4 (May 20, 2009); see Marta Picchi, Climate Change and 
the Protection of Human Rights: The Issue of “Climate Refugees”, 13 U.S.-
CHINA L. REV. 576, 579 (2016) (“in this essay, the author used the concept 
of ‘climate refugees’ to characterize people forced to abandon their place 
of origin because of an environmental stressor, regardless of whether or 
not they cross an international border.”).
80 Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107 (noting relevance of climate change to 
decision to immigrate but granting application for visa on other grounds); 
In re: AD (Tuvalu), [2014] Cases 501370-371 (New Zealand) (rejecting 
application for refugee status); RRT Case Number 0907346, [2009] RRTA 
1168, (Refugee Review Tribunal, 10 Dec. 2009) (Australia); Refugee Appeal 
No. 72189/2000 (Refugee Status Appeals Authority, S. Joe, Aug. 17, 2000) 
(New Zealand).
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follow in the wake of mutually reinforcing national 
and international legal developments, such as the 
Paris Agreement and national legislation adopted 
in pursuit of commitments announced in pre-
Agreement INDCs and post-Agreement NDCs. More 
specifically, where REDD+ and the Green Climate 
Fund prompt national legislative or regulatory 
measures, disputes over those measures and the 
resources they govern are likely to follow. Another 
factor that seems likely to promote climate change 
ligation is more straightforward: the proliferation 
and diffusion of climate change litigation know-
how will make it easier to find capable lawyers 
with experience arguing tested legal theories,81 
 particularly because several NGOs stand ready to 
provide counsel for such cases. In sum, a growing, 
increasingly coherent, and increasingly well-worn 
body of law may provide grounds for litigation aimed 
at dealing with climate change-related impacts 
through mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
81 See, e.g., General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 
Climate Change: A Comparative Overview of the Rights Based Approach 
in the Americas 61–66 (Nov. 2016), https://perma.cc/LGQ9-MS8U 
(summarizing cases adjudicated in the Americas that deal directly or 
indirectly with climate change after describing legal background for those 
cases).
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Global climate change litigation raises a number 
of common issues which recur in numerous 
jurisdictions. As an initial matter, courts and 
advocates may encounter questions of justiciability, 
including questions of standing and separation of 
powers principles. Once a court reaches the merits 
of justiciable claims, there are a broad range of 
potential sources of legal rights and obligations, 
including international law, constitutional law, 
common law, statutory or legislative law, and 
national policy. Finally, courts that find a valid legal 
basis for a claim and a violation of the law must still 
address the question of remedy. This section details 
the ways in which these issues arise at the different 
stages of climate change litigation.
3.1 Justiciability
Justiciability refers in general to a person’s ability to 
claim a remedy before a judicial body when a violation 
of a right has either occurred or is likely to occur.82 
 The term implies access to appropriate mechanisms 
to protect recognized rights. A case is said to be 
justiciable in a particular forum if that forum both 
is capable of deciding the matter and considers it 
appropriate to do so. The justiciability analysis entails 
both legal and prudential questions. First is the 
82 International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative experiences of 
justiciability (2008), https://perma.cc/YU9F-YCNR.
question of whether the court is legally empowered 
to adjudicate the case – this typically depends on the 
constitutional grant of authority to the court. Second 
is the question of whether it would be imprudent for 
the court to adjudicate the case – the court typically 
has discretion to determine this matter based on the 
facts before it. 
The doctrine of justiciability varies by jurisdiction. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a justiciable 
controversy “must be definite and concrete, 
touching the legal relations of parties having 
adverse legal interests...It must be a real and 
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the 
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”83 
The English House of Lords has applied a similar 
but more general standard for justiciability, holding 
that a controversy is non-justiciable if there are “no 
judicial or manageable standards” by which to judge 
the case.84
While the precise contours of the justiciability 
doctrine differ, there are two elements that are 
common to many jurisdictions. The first is a 
requirement that plaintiffs must have standing to 
bring the case. As detailed below, the criteria for 
83 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937).
84 Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, at 938.
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standing are closely linked to the principle that there 
be a real “case and controversy” and “manageable 
standards” to guide the adjudication of the case. The 
second is a requirement that the judicial resolution 
of the case must not violate the principle of the 
separation or balance of powers. 
3.1.1 Standing
The legal definition of “standing,” or locus standi,  varies 
among countries, and may be more or less open or 
restrictive depending on which country and legal 
system (civil or common law) one is operating in.85 
 In essence, the term refers to the criteria one must 
satisfy in order to be a party to a legal proceeding. 
These criteria are typically aimed at ensuring that 
the parties have a sufficient stake in the outcome of 
the case and that the claims brought by the parties 
are capable of judicial resolution. For example, some 
jurisdictions require plaintiffs to show that they 
85 See generally, George Pring & Catherine Pring, Environmental Courts and 
Tribunals, in DECISIONMAKING IN ENVTL. L. (L. Paddock, R. Glicksman & 
N. Bryner, eds. 2016) (“Standing rules around the world range from very 
restrictive to very open”); Matt Handley, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and 
American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of 
Standing to Sue, 21 REV. LITIG. 97 (2002).
have suffered or will suffer an injury that is caused 
by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful behavior, and 
that the adjudicating body is capable of providing 
a remedy that will eliminate or otherwise mitigate 
that injury.
Standing criteria may pose a barrier to climate 
change litigation. For example, it may be difficult 
for an individual plaintiff to establish an adequate 
causal connection between a defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful actions or inaction and an injury that is 
linked to climate change impacts. This is a particular 
challenge in jurisdictions that require plaintiffs 
to establish a “particularized injury” for standing 
purposes. However, some jurisdictions allow 
individuals and groups to sue based on injuries that 
are general to the public, thus making it easier for 
plaintiffs to pursue climate-related claims.
In the U.S., the question of standing has been central 
to climate change litigation. In Massachusetts v. 
EPA, several states, cities and environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) sued the federal 
government, challenging the decision not to regulate 
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under the 
U.S. (Mass v. EPA) 
A group of states, local governments, and 
environmental organizations petitioned for 
review of an U.S. EPA order denying a petition for 
rulemaking to regulate GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles under the U.S. Clean Air Act. 
Two key issues were: (1) whether EPA had statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse emissions under 
the Act, and (2) whether EPA could decline to 
regulate greenhouse emissions based on policy 
judgments that fall outside the scope of the 
regulatory considerations outlined in the Act.  The 
Supreme Court held that EPA did have statutory 
authority to regulate because CO2 and other GHGs 
fall within the Act’s broad definition of “air pollutant” 
and that EPA cannot deny a petition to regulate on 
grounds that are not enumerated in the Act. The 
court remanded to EPA, instructing the agency to 
either issue an endangerment finding for GHGs or 
provide a basis for not issuing the endangerment 
finding that is grounded in the statute. On remand, 
EPA issued a positive endangerment finding that 
GHGs from motor vehicles do endanger public 
health and welfare.
The question of whether the plaintiffs—or 
anyone—had standing to sue over EPA’s denial of 
a petition for rulemaking was a key point of dispute 
in the case, and one emphasized by the dissenting 
justices in their explanation of why they would 
have decided the case differently. The Court’s 
determination that Massachusetts and other states 
had standing to sue relied on “the special position 
and interest of Massachusetts.” As the Court 
explained, “It is of considerable relevance that the 
party seeking review here is a sovereign State and 
not . . . a private individual.” 
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Clean Air Act. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the 
plaintiff states’ special status as quasi-sovereigns 
within the federal system, and on their sovereign 
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis prospective loss 
of coastal land, to find that they had standing to 
sue.86 By contrast, in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiff 
landowners harmed by Hurricane Katrina lacked 
standing to sue fossil fuel and chemical companies 
for alleged civil conspiracy because their injuries 
were not fairly traceable to the companies’ conduct.87 
Specifically, the court found that the causal chain 
between the GHG emissions generated by those 
companies’ activities and the damages caused by 
Hurricane Katrina was too attenuated.
Standing battles have not been unique to the 
United States. In Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, the Hague District Court held 
that Urgenda had standing on its own behalf, due 
to a Dutch law which allows non-governmental 
organizations to bring a court action to protect the 
general interests or collective interests for other 
persons, but – “partly for practical reasons” – the 886 
individual claimants involved in the suit were not 
granted standing separate from that of Urgenda.88 
In the Australian case of Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v. 
Environment Protection Authority, the Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal found several plaintiffs 
who objected to approvals granted to a new power 
station, alleging that it would emit GHGs that 
contribute to climate change, had standing to sue 
under the Environmental Protection Act.89 The court 
there explained: 
“...despite the global nature of the GHG issue, there 
must still be a materiality threshold in relation to 
the type or size of the works or emissions that 
is relevant to whether a person’s interests are 
genuinely affected, as opposed to being too 
remote or too general. The emission of a few 
tonnes of GHG from a small factory in Gippsland 
would not in our view give rise to standing under 
s 33B(1) to an objector in Mildura even though 
86 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
87 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009).
88 Urgenda, paras. 1-408, 1-409.
89 Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v. Environment Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308.
it represents an incremental GHG increase. It is 
unnecessary for us to determine where the line 
of materiality might be drawn. As we noted in our 
introduction, the DGDP is a major power station 
that will generate up to 4.2 million tonnes of GHG 
per annum over a 30 year projected life cycle and 
increase Victoria’s GHG emissions profile by 2.5% 
over 2009 levels. In our view, this clearly raises 
potential issues of material interest or concern to 
all Victorians, and creates an almost unique level 
of “affected interests” and standing compared to 
the more usual sort of works approval matters 
that come before the Tribunal.” 90
The New South Wales Land and Environment Court 
reached a similar result in Haughton v Minister for 
Planning and Macquarie Generation, holding that the 
plaintiff’s suit was prompted not just by “intellectual 
or emotional concern,” but by a legally cognizable 
“special interest” in the alleged harms.91
The question of standing to bring climate-
related litigation has received far less attention 
from courts in developing countries. For 
example, in Leghari v. Pakistan, the High Court of 
Pakistan noted that the petitioner was a citizen 
seeking to enforce fundamental rights but did 
not otherwise discuss the issue of standing.92 
In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal 
initiated the case on its own, consistent with its prior 
interpretation of the authority granted to the court 
by statute, and thus standing was not an issue.93 
Other cases where standing issues were never 
briefed or discussed by the court include Greenpeace 
Southeast Asia et al., Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, and the 
Colombian case, Decision C-035/16 of February 8, 
2016.
90 Id. para. 134.
91 [2011] NSWLEC 217, paras. 101–102.
92 Leghari v. Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Supplemental Decision) 
at 3.
93 While the authorizing statute (the India National Green Tribunal Act of 
2010) does not expressly authorize the tribunal to initiate proceedings 
without an application, it does not expressly forbid the tribunal from 
doing so, and the tribunal has exercised such suo motu jurisdiciton on 
numerous occasions. See Gitanjali Nain Gill, Environmental Justice in India: 
The National Green Tribunal and Expert Members, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 
175 (2016).
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3.1.2 Separation or Balance of Powers
The principle of separation or balance of powers 
dictates that one branch of government cannot 
exceed the authority granted to it by the constitution 
or other laws and intrude on the authority of another 
branch. While this doctrine is typically evoked as a 
matter of constitutional law, it also applies in non-
constitutional systems to the extent that there 
are policies, laws and regulations outlining the 
respective powers of each branch of government. 
The underlying question here is whether the courts 
are the appropriate forum to hear and resolve 
questions of equity, rights, and obligations in regards 
to climate change. 
Separation of powers principles have factored 
prominently in U.S. climate change litigation. 
Standing, discussed just above, reflects separation 
of powers concerns, as courts ostensibly invoke the 
doctrine in order to limit themselves to exercising the 
judicial power, rather than the legislative or executive 
powers reserved for other branches of government. 
However, separation of powers principles also take 
on other forms. In Connecticut v. AEP a federal district 
court judge in New York concluded that climate 
change was a “patently political” and “transcendently 
legislative” issue, and that the political question 
doctrine barred the court from hearing the case.94
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this 
aspect of the decision, concluding that regulation 
of climate change-causing emissions was not 
an inherently political question, and that the 
court was well within its purview to hear a public 
nuisance suit against GHG emissions sources.95 
 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually declined to hear 
the substantive claims, for a somewhat different 
reason, though one also premised in separation of 
powers concerns. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that Congress, in enacting the federal Clean Air Act 
and authorizing the U.S. Environmental Protection 
94 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
95 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
Agency to address climate change, had “displaced” 
the judiciary’s authority to provide a remedy for such 
public nuisance claims.96
Separation of powers principles were also 
addressed by the Hague District Court in Urgenda.97 
There, the government defendant argued that the 
remedy sought by plaintiffs (a court order requiring 
the State to limit GHG emissions) would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine by taking a decision 
that should be left to democratically elected leaders 
and placing it in the hands of the judiciary. The court 
disagreed, finding that Dutch law actually requires 
the judiciary to assess the actions of political bodies 
when the rights of citizens are at stake, even if the 
resolution of the case has political outcomes. The 
court explained that Urgenda’s claim “essentially 
concerns legal protection [of rights]” and therefore 
requires judicial intervention.98
This aspect of the Urgenda decision is not surprising: 
generally speaking, the adjudication of disputes 
concerning constitutional or human rights falls 
squarely within the powers of the judicial branch. 
Indeed, there are other climate change cases 
involving the protection of constitutional and human 
rights where courts have exercised jurisdiction over 
rights-related disputes without even discussing the 
separation of powers doctrine, presumably because 
there is no dispute that such disputes fall within 
the courts’ domain. These cases include Leghari v. 
Federation of Pakistan, In re Court on its own motion v. 
State of Himachal Pradesh and others, and Gbemre v. 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.
3.2 Sources of Legal Rights and Obligations
Once a matter is determined to be justiciable and 
a court has jurisdiction to hear the matter, the case 
turns to the substantive merits. As climate change 
litigation has expanded attorneys and judges have 
engaged with a multiplicity of legal theories relying 
on a variety of sources of legal rights and obligations.
96 Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. at 415; see also Kivalina, 696 F.3d 
at 856 (finding that plaintiffs’ federal common law claims pertaining to 
climate change had been displaced by the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act).
97 Urgenda, paras. 4.94-4.107
98 Id. para. 4.98.
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3.2.1 International law
3.2.1.1 Human rights
The core international human rights treaties do not 
recognize a freestanding right to a clean environment, 
or to a stable climate. However, it has long been 
recognized that inadequate environmental 
conditions can undermine the effective enjoyment 
of other enumerated rights, such as the rights to 
life, health, water, and food. Consistent with this 
recognition, the right to a clean environment 
has been codified in international human rights 
treaties, soft law instruments, regional human rights 
agreements, national constitutions, and sub-national 
constitutions.99 The relationship between human 
rights and climate change has been more recently 
the subject of attention from a variety of bodies.100 
The climate change and human rights discourse was 
instigated in large part by litigation.
In December 2005, the Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference submitted a petition to the Inter-
99 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship  Between Climate Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/N45M-3VES.
100 See generally UNEP, Climate Change and Human Rights (2016), https://
perma.cc/BF65-E7UP.
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
requesting relief for human rights violations 
resulting from the impacts of global warming and 
climate change. The petition alleged that the U.S.—
the largest cumulative emitter of GHG emissions at 
that time—had violated the Inuit’s human rights 
by failing to adopt adequate GHG controls.101 
Although the Commission never issued a decision, 
the petition did succeed in drawing public attention 
to the severe effects of global warming on the Inuit 
and instigating further discussion about the human 
rights implications of climate change.102
In a less well-known decision from that same year 
the Federal Court of Nigeria in Gbemre v. Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd 
held that Shell’s flaring of methane from its gas 
production activities on the Niger Delta violated 
101 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global 
Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 
2005) [hereinafter Inuit Petition]. The Inuit live in arctic regions of Alaska, 
Canada, Greenland, and Russia that have experienced especially rapid 
and disruptive climate change impacts, including significantly warmer 
temperatures than normal, reduced sea ice, higher rates of coastal erosion, 
and disruptions to ecosystems that affect food chains. Duane Smith, 
Climate Change In The Arctic: An Inuit Reality, UN Chronicle, Vol. XLIV No. 2 
(June 2007).
102 Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate 
Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007).
Philippines 
Greenpeace Southeast Asia and numerous other 
organizations and individuals filed a petition 
asking the Philippine Human Rights Commission 
to investigate a general issue—“the human 
rights implications of climate change and ocean 
acidification and the resulting rights violations 
in the Philippines”—and a more specific one—
“whether the investor-owned Carbon Majors have 
breached their responsibilities to respect the rights 
of the Filipino people.” 
The core factual allegation of the petition draws 
on research identifying particular entities’ quantum 
of responsibility for anthropogenic GHG emissions 
since 1751. The petition names 50 of those entities, 
all publicly traded corporations, as respondents. 
It identifies multiple sources of human rights, 
but draws most heavily on the UN Human Rights 
Commission’s Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. Responses submitted by those 
entities have either implied or stated explicitly 
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction or authority 
to compel answers from them to Greenpeace’s 
petition.
Like Lliuya v. RWE, this investigation focuses on 
whether the law should attach liability to the causal 
relationship between the act of emitting GHGs 
and the adverse climate impacts that eventually 
result. However, because the Commission’s 
authority is limited to investigating and issuing 
recommendations, the stakes are somewhat lower. 
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human rights to a clean and healthy environment 
protected under the Nigerian constitution and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.103 
The contribution of GHGs to global climate change 
was among the allegations recognized by the court. 
More recently, international human rights law has 
been both the subject of and an element within 
climate change litigation. In Greenpeace Southeast 
Asia et al., environmentalists and Filipino citizens 
have petitioned the Philippine Commission on 
Human Rights to investigate whether a group of 
“Carbon Majors” have violated Filipinos’ human 
rights under domestic and international law.104 
In Urgenda, the plaintiffs alleged the Dutch 
government’s backsliding on its GHG emissions 
commitment violated, among other things, human 
rights protected under international law. The Hague 
District Court did not adopt that argument, but did 
refer to international human rights law in reaching its 
determination that there had been a violation of the 
government’s duty of care. In Leghari v. Pakistan the 
Lahore High Court Green Bench reached a similar 
conclusion. Plaintiffs in similar suits brought in 
Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland have also alluded 
to international human rights and obligations.    
3.2.1.2 Refugee law
In the coming decades, climate change will displace 
millions of people from their homes. Current 
estimates of the number of “climate refugees” and 
“environmental migrants” by 2050 range from 25 
million to 1 billion people, and the number could soar 
still higher later in the century if GHG emissions are 
not seriously reduced. Yet, there is no international 
agreement on the rights of persons displaced by 
climate change or the obligations of countries with 
respect to them. A couple of early cases from New 
Zealand preview how courts may approach such 
cases.
In Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment a Kiribati citizen 
appealed the denial of refugee status to the New 
103 Gbemre v. Shell, FHC/B/CS/53/05.
104 Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia, supra note 53.
Zealand courts, arguing that the effects of climate 
change on Kiribati, namely rising ocean levels and 
environmental degradation, are forcing citizens 
off the island. The Supreme Court of New Zealand 
concluded that climate-induced displacement did 
not qualify the applicant for refugee status under 
international human rights law, including the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The Court noted, however, that its decision 
does not rule out the possibility “that environmental 
degradation resulting from climate change or 
other natural disasters could . . . create a pathway 
into the Refugee Convention or protected person 
jurisdiction.”105
In re: AD was another case before the New Zealand 
courts, in which a family from Tuvalu appealed after 
they were denied resident visas, similarly arguing that 
they would be at risk of suffering the adverse impacts 
of climate change if they were deported to Tuvalu.106 
Pursuant to the Immigration Act 2009, the New 
Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal 
found that the family had established “exceptional 
circumstances of a humanitarian nature, which would 
make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to 
be removed from New Zealand.” However, while the 
Tribunal acknowledged that climate change impacts 
may affect enjoyment of human rights, it explicitly 
declined to reach the question of whether climate 
change provided a basis for granting resident visas in 
this case, and instead based its finding of “exceptional 
circumstances” on other factors, including the 
presence of the husband’s extended family in New 
Zealand, the family’s integration into the New Zealand 
community, and the best interests of the children.
3.2.2 The Right to a Clean or Healthy Environment
Nations around the world have assured their 
citizens of a constitutional right to a clean or healthy 
environment. According to a 2012 survey, there are 
at least 92 countries that have granted constitutional 
status to this right, and a total of 177 countries 
recognize the right through their constitutions, 
environmental legislation, court decisions, or 
105 [2015] NZSC 107, para. 13.
106 [2014] NZIPT 501370-371.
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ratification of an international agreement.107 
Courts around the world have begun to reckon with 
the implications of this right in the age of climate 
change.
In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal 
Principal Bench in New Delhi invoked constitutional 
protection of the environment and ordered 
authorities in Himachal Pradesh to undertake 
several measures to protect against environmental 
harms made more likely and extreme by climate 
change.108 In Decision C-035/16 of February 8, 
2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck 
down as unconstitutional statutory provisions 
that threatened high-altitude ecosystems, called 
páramos, which are known not only to provide 
water but also to sequester carbon dioxide.109 
In Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature & Youth 
v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy two environmental 
NGOs filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment 
107 David Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, ENV’T SCI. 
& POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., July-Aug. 2012.
108 State of Himachal Pradesh, M.A. Nos. 389/2014, 1145/2015, 1250/2015, 
324/2016 & 325/2016 (Nat’l Green Tribunal).
109 Constitutional Court, Feb. 8, 2016, Decision C-035/16.
from the Oslo District Court that Norway’s Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy violated the Norwegian 
constitution by issuing a block of oil and gas licenses 
for deep-sea extraction from sites in the Barents Sea.
Other cases that have invoked a constitutional or 
domestic right to a clean or healthy environment 
include: the Austrian Federal Administrative Court’s 
rejection in February 2017 of a third runway at Vienna 
airport (noting that constitutions of Austria and the 
region of Lower Austria both enshrine commitments 
to sustainability and environmental protection), 
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria Ltd (finding that Shell’s gas flaring violated 
the constitutionally protected right to a “pollution-
free and healthy environment”), and Leghari v. 
Federation of Pakistan (finding that government’s 
failure to prepare for and respond to climate change 
violated the constitutionally protected right to a 
“healthy and clean environment”). As discussed 
above, there are other cases where plaintiffs alleged 
violations of other types of rights – such as the right 
to life – but these cases did not entail allegations of a 
domestically protected right to a clean environment.
India
In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal 
(NGT) Principal Bench in New Delhi acted sua 
sponte under the authority granted it by its enabling 
statute and ordered authorities in Himachal 
Pradesh to undertake several measures to protect 
against environmental harms made more likely 
and extreme by climate change.  The primary legal 
basis for the NGT’s decision is Article 21 of India’s 
constitution, which provides for a fundamental 
right to what the NGT calls a “wholesome, clean, 
decent environment.” 
The NGT concluded that the government of 
Himachal Pradesh had violated its obligations 
under article 21 and other provisions by failing 
to restrict development and road and pedestrian 
traffic in and around the increasingly touristed area 
accessible via the Rohatang Pass. This area is marked 
by melting glaciers and deforestation, and the NGT 
concluded that the emission of black carbon from 
vehicle traffic is a chief cause of the glacial melting. 
The NGT concluded both that global warming 
heightens the need to take protective measures of 
a region sensitive to emissions and deforestation, 
and that that “there is a need to tackle global 
warming” in order to avert the sort of environmental 
degradation at issue in the case. 
As with the Colombian case, this decision applies 
a law not written to address climate change in 
a way that compels governments to support 
and encourage more effective climate change 
adaption efforts. Its holding is thus rooted in 
rights that the court views as being compromised 
by a combination of changing environmental 
circumstances and government inaction.
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Thus far, however, very few countries have seen 
fit to address climate change constitutionally. The 
Dominican Republic’s constitution is unusual for 
doing so. Under “The Organization of the Territory,” 
that constitution provides for a “plan of territorial 
ordering that assures the efficient and sustainable use 
of the natural resources of the Nation, in accordance 
with the need of adaptation to climate change…”110 
The constitution of Tunisia does so as well.111 
Constitutional provisions like these can provide 
governments with uniquely important foundations 
and persistent motivation to enact and implement 
policies that address climate change and its impacts. 
International agreements like the Paris Agreement 
and the Marrakech Accord of 2016 cannot substitute 
for such provisions, even in combination with the 
national laws that implement nationally determined 
contributions. 
3.2.3 Common law: Tort, Nuisance and Negligence
Common law jurisdictions recognize causes of action 
for tort, nuisance, and negligence cases, all of which 
are gradually developed and refined through case 
law. Plaintiffs in these jurisdictions have begun to 
use these as a basis for bringing lawsuits pertaining 
to the damage caused by climate change – the 
idea being that a government or private actor that 
contributes to climate change is committing a tort, 
causing a nuisance, or behaving negligently and the 
plaintiff should therefore be entitled to some form of 
judicial relief for the damages caused by that unlawful 
behavior. Civil law jurisdictions may recognize similar 
causes of action within their respective legal codes 
– the Dutch code, for example, recognizes that the 
government owes a duty of care to its citizens, and 
this was the basis for the Urgenda decision discussed 
above.
However, the theories of tort, nuisance, and 
negligence are not available in civil law jurisdictions 
as a general matter. U.S. plaintiffs have pursued 
several common law actions based on injuries caused 
110 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 194, https://perma.cc/ZCJ8-
VGGK (accessed Feb. 21, 2017).
111 Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014 (translated by the Constitution Project) art. 
45, https://perma.cc/4RFF-TXZT.
by climate change, but have had very little success to 
date.  One key barrier to these claims is the doctrine 
of displacement, whereby statutory and regulatory 
codifications of law displace the common law when 
the codification speaks directly to the question at 
issue (thus eliminating any common law cause of 
action). In AEP v. Connecticut, plaintiff states, cities 
and NGOs claimed that the CO2 emissions from 
four private power companies and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority contribute to global warming 
and therefore constitute a public nuisance under 
federal law, and sought an injunction ordering the 
companies to lower their emissions. The U.S. Supreme 
Court determined that any existing federal common 
law cause of action had been displaced by the 
Clean Air Act, which authorizes EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions from power plants and other sources.112 
In Native Village of Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit 
extended this holding to a federal public nuisance 
claim against a number of energy producers—
including ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron and other 
fossil fuel companies—for climate change 
damages associated with defendants’ activities.113 
Notably, plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina 
alleged that direct emissions associated with the 
energy companies’ operations contributed to 
climate change—they did not address indirect, or 
downstream, emissions associated with defendants’ 
extractive activities, such as those that would be at 
issue in a case against federal agencies for mineral 
leasing. 
Common law suits also face challenges associated 
with the difficulty of establishing a causal connection 
between the defendant’s actions and an injury to 
the plaintiff. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, plaintiff 
property owners alleged that certain power and 
chemical companies’ GHG emissions contributed 
to climate change, which in turn exacerbated the 
harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, constituting 
a private nuisance (as well as a public nuisance, 
trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation and civil conspiracy).114 
112 Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at 424.
113 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
114 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010), petition for 
writ of mandamus denied sub nom. In re Comer, 562 U.S. 1133 (2011).
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The case involved a convoluted procedural history, 
featuring a dismissal in district court, a reversal 
at the Fifth Circuit, an en banc decision to vacate 
the reversal due to failure to muster a quorum, 
plaintiffs’ filing of a writ of mandamus asking the 
Supreme Court to reinstate the panel decision, 
the denial of the writ, plaintiffs’ re-filing of their 
case in district court, and dismissal based on res 
judicata grounds – though not on the merits.115 
As noted earlier, the case was ultimately rejected on 
standing grounds, because the plaintiffs could not 
establish that their injuries were fairly traceable to 
the companies’ GHG emissions. If such a case were 
to proceed to trial, plaintiffs would have an even 
higher burden to satisfy in showing the activities 
caused the harm. 
Problems confronting common law causes of 
action are, again, not limited to the United States. 
115 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 855–68 (S.D. Miss. 
2012) (dismissing re-filed complaint on preemption, political question, 
standing, res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460 
(5th Cir. 2013).
In Macquerie Generation v. Hodgson, a case from 
Australia, the plaintiff claimed that the license for 
a coal-fired power plant should be interpreted as 
containing a common law condition which limited 
the plant’s CO2 emissions to the level that would 
be achieved by exercising reasonable care for the 
environment. The lower court held in favor of the 
plaintiffs, but this decision was reversed on appeal. 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the plaintiff 
could not prevail because they had not alleged 
that the CO2 emissions from the plant actually 
caused a nuisance, and there was no independent 
legal basis for interpreting the license as containing 
an implied limitation on CO2 emissions.116 
In dicta, the court also suggested that it would be 
difficult to have an actionable nuisance based on 
CO2 emissions “because CO2 is colourless, odourless 
and inert.”117
Another case, Lliuya v. RWE AG, was dismissed on 
grounds similar to those articulated in Comer v. 
116 Macquerie Generation v. Hodgson, [2011] NSWCA 424, at paras 35–67.
117 Id. para 45.
Australia 
In Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council a group of 
plaintiffs who own property along Belongil Beach in 
New South Wales, Australia sought damages from 
the local government authority, the Byron Shire 
Council, to cover the costs of erecting shoreline 
protections on their parcels and to compensate 
for lost value to their properties from encroaching 
seas.  The plaintiffs alleged that the need for 
those protections and the cause of the properties’ 
partial loss of value was the fault of the Council, 
which years before constructed a form of hard 
shoreline armoring. The plaintiffs argued that the 
Council was negligent for installing hard shoreline 
armoring that displaced wave action to plaintiffs’ 
adjacent portions of beach, worsening erosion 
there; or, alternatively, that the council’s armoring 
constitutes an instance of public nuisance. 
After the plaintiffs’ suit survived a motion to dismiss 
in March 2016, the Council’s insurers, who had 
been steering the defense in the case, agreed to 
a settlement that bars the Council from removing 
existing coastal armoring (chiefly rock, concrete, 
and rubble barriers) on the plaintiffs’ parcels unless 
the plaintiffs agree to such removal. If the plaintiffs 
want to add to that armoring, they must apply 
within one year of the settlement, dated August 
2016. They must then make the requested additions 
within one year of approval of their application. 
Any subsequent repairs or additions may only 
be proposed after 20 years, and the Council has 
not guaranteed that such proposals would be 
approved.
This case illustrates how common law claims can 
be wielded in opposition to adaptation efforts. It 
is very likely a harbinger of the large number of 
similar disputes that can be expected to arise as 
governments stumble forward in efforts to facilitate 
or compel retreat from coastlines threatened by 
rising sea levels and increasingly powerful coastal 
storms.
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Murphy Oil USA. There, a Peruvian farmer alleged that 
the GHG emissions generated by a large German 
utility constituted a nuisance under German law. 
The farmer sought damages to offset the costs 
of protecting his town from melting glaciers; the 
damages requested (0.47 percent of the estimated 
cost of protective measures) corresponded with 
the company’s annual contribution to global GHG 
emissions (also 0.47 percent). The court rejected the 
claim, in part because it found that there was no 
“linear causal chain” linking the alleged injury to the 
company’s emissions.118 
Plaintiffs have also begun to use common law 
claims to hold government actors accountable for 
failure to prepare for and adapt to climate change. 
In Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council a group of 
property owners in New South Wales, Australia 
sought damages from the local government 
authority to cover the costs of erecting shoreline 
protections on their parcels and to compensate for 
lost value to their properties from encroaching seas. 
The two legal theories advanced by the property 
owners to support their claim were: (i) that the 
local government was negligent for installing hard 
shoreline armoring that has since displaced wave 
action to their properties, worsening erosion and 
causing damage, and (ii) that the shoreline armoring 
constituted a public nuisance. The lawsuit survived a 
motion to dismiss, but was ultimately settled before 
it could be resolved on the merits. In In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches, property owners sought damages 
from the U.S. government for its management of 
water management infrastructure, arguing that 
the government’s negligent management of the 
channel had contributed to damages caused by 
Hurricane Katrina.119 Plaintiffs in that case were 
denied a remedy based on the government’s 
sovereign immunity from a negligence claim. But 
in St. Bernard Parish Government the Federal Court 
of Claims found that the same management of the 
118 David verliert den Kampf gegen Goliath, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/X6WQ-LVJ3 (“Eine Flutgefahr 
wäre jedoch der RWE AG nicht individuell zuzuordnen.”).
119 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d at 441, cert. denied sub nom., 
Lattimore v. U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
same infrastructure effectuated a temporary taking, 
a claim to which sovereign immunity does not apply.
3.2.4 Statutory authority and national policy
In a number of instances, statutes or national 
policies have codified climate change obligations 
for private and public actors, and disputes have then 
arisen over those obligations’ legality, applicability, 
or implementation. 
In the European Union the development of the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) under the Kyoto 
Protocol led to a number of cases, both before EU 
courts and in national courts. The majority of EU ETS 
cases were challenges to the scheme and subsequent 
regulations. There were several lawsuits filed against 
the Directive establishing the scheme, challenging 
its applicability to certain sectors or countries.120 
When legislation was passed in 2008 to incorporate 
aviation emissions in the EU into the Scheme, 
another suit was initiated by the aviation industry.121 
Numerous other suits were filed during and after 
the process of Member States’ development of 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs).122 In Spain, for 
example, at least eleven cases arose out of Spain’s 
implementation of the EU ETS through Royal Decree 
1866/2004, which approved its NAP for the 2005-
2007 period. Sources challenged their assignment 
of emissions credits in the NAP and requested an 
increase in emissions allowances.123
In the U.S., significant litigation has taken place under 
the federal Clean Air Act, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act. 
The first Clean Air Act case was Massachusetts v. 
EPA, where the Supreme Court held that GHGs fell 
120 Société Arcelor v. Premier Minister, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-09895 
(dismissing challenge of Directive 2003/87/EC under the principle of 
equality); Arcelor SA v. Parliament, Case T-16/04 [2010] E.C.R. II-00211, 
(dismissing a challenge of Directive 2003/87/EC on the basis that is 
violated several principles of common law); Poland v. Commission, Case 
T-183/07, [2009] E.C.R. II-03395 (dismissing challenge of Directive 2003/87/
EC).
121 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change, No. 
C-366/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-13755 (challenging U.S. airlines’ inclusion in EU’s 
Emission Trading Scheme).
122 European Commission, Climate Action: National Allocation Plans, https://
perma.cc/P4ZW-7RLQ (accessed Mar. 4, 2017).
123 E.g., Judgment No. 5347/2008 of October 6, 2008, Supreme Court of Spain, 
Administrative Litigation Division (Section 5) Appeal No. 100/2005.
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within the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant” 
and thus the EPA had the authority to regulate them 
(as well as a corresponding obligation to determine 
whether regulation was necessary to protect the 
public health and welfare). Since that decision, there 
have been a variety of lawsuits challenging both the 
Clean Air Act regulations that EPA has promulgated 
respecting the control of GHG emissions124 
as well as EPA’s failure to promptly issue regulations 
for certain sources of GHGs.125 
The cases brought under NEPA involve federal 
agencies’ obligation to consider climate change 
when conducting environmental reviews for federal 
projects. There have been a number of successful 
NEPA cases asserting that these agencies failed 
to account for the full scope of GHG emissions 
associated with projects – for example, GHG 
emissions from the combustion of coal that will be 
produced as a result of a federal coal mining permit.126 
Litigants have also begun to use NEPA to challenge 
agency failures to adequately account for the effects 
of climate change on the project and its surrounding 
environment – but thus far, there have not been 
any decisions overturning a federal environmental 
review on these grounds.127
Finally, the Endangered Species Act has provided 
a basis for legal challenges where federal agencies 
have failed to account for climate change when 
making decisions about the listing and conservation 
of threatened and endangered species. Most of the 
courts overseeing these cases have held that the 
124 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1306 (D.C. Cir.); North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-
1381 (D.C. Cir.); Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, No. 16-1005 (D.C. Cir.). 
Summaries and pleadings for each of these cases are available from the 
Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer U.S. Climate Change Litigation 
database: http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/.
125 Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,  No. 16-1005 (D.C. Cir.); Center for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Summaries and pleadings for 
each of these cases are available from the Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter 
Kaye Scholer U.S. Climate Change Litigation database: http://wordpress2.
ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/.
126 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 2016; Jessica Wentz, Climate Change and Environmental Impact 
Assessment, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVTL. L. vol II 283 (Michael Faure 
general ed. 2016).
127 See Jessica Wentz, Considering the Effects of Climate Change on Natural 
Resources in Environmental Review and Planning Documents Guidance 
for Agencies and Practitioners (Sept. 2016),
current and future effects of climate change must be 
considered when deciding whether to list a species 
and determining that species’ critical habitat.128
Australian climate change litigation has been largely 
dominated by cases surrounding environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) and environmental 
permitting.129 These cases generally arise in the context 
of Australia’s federal and state EIA and planning laws, 
particularly the New South Wales Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 and the 
Victoria Planning and Environmental Act of 1987. 
Some cases have focused on permitting emissions 
sources, frequently with the aim of preventing coal-
fired energy production through targeting proposed 
coal mines and power generation facilities.130 
While Australian state courts have generally 
agreed that direct GHG emissions should be 
considered in the permitting process, they 
have not usually found emissions sufficient 
to justify rejection of a proposed project,131 
and they have diverged in regards to 
indirect, or “downstream,” emissions.132 
Other cases have focused on whether proposed 
construction projects adequately accounted for 
future climate change impacts and the proper 
role for “reverse EIA”—assessment of the potential 
impacts of climate change on a proposed project—
in permitting.133
South Africa, as of March 2017, provides another 
example of a country where EIAs must consider 
climate change. That follows from the South African 
High Court’s rejection of approval for development of 
a coal-fired power plant on the grounds that climate 
128 See id.
129 Wilensky, supra note 12, at 153–57.
130 In Terminals Pty Ltd. v. Greater Geelong City Council, [2005] VCAT 1988, local 
residents challenged the permitting of a chemical storage facility. All other 
cases within the category were challenges to proposed coal mines or coal-
fired power plants.
131 E.g., Re Australian Conservation Foundation, [2004] 140 LGERA 100 (holding 
that the assessment panel must consider the impacts of GHG emissions 
on the environment); Greenpeace v Redbank Power, [1994] 86 LGERA 143, 
153-55 (finding that the project should be approved despite climate 
change impacts).
132 See Gray v. Minister for Planning [2006] 152 LGERA 258; Xstrata Coal 
Queensland v Friends of the Earth [2012] QLC 013.
133 See, e.g., Taip v. East Gippsland Shire Council, [2010] VCAT 1222 (holding that 
EIA must consider expected impacts of climate change—chiefly sea level 
rise—on area subject to planning scheme amendment).
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change and its impacts are relevant considerations 
for the EIA of such a project. 
 
In some instances, and in an increasing number of 
them, countries have adopted national climate laws 
or policies that can provide a basis for litigation. 
For example, the Austrian federal administrative 
court’s recent rejection of a proposal to expand 
Vienna airport grounded that decision firmly on the 
numeric GHG emissions reduction requirements 
imposed by Austria’s 2011 Climate Protection Act on 
the transportation sector.134 Similarly, in Thomson v. 
Minister for Climate Change Issues, petitioners alleged 
that the country’s INDC was inadequate because 
it fell short of what was required by New Zealand’s 
Climate Change Response Act 2002. The purpose of 
the Act, which was to “enable New Zealand to meet 
its international obligations under the [UNFCCC],” 
provided the domestic legal hook that was needed to 
bring the legal challenge with respect to the INDC.135 
In Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, the Lahore High 
134  See Klimaschutzgesetz [Climate Protection Act], Bgbl. I Nr. 106, 4 (Nov. 
2011), https://perma.cc/2HR2-VB5Q.
135  Climate Change Response Act 2002 § 3(1)(a).
Court referred to Pakistan’s 2012 National Climate 
Policy and Framework  and determined that the 
government’s failure to implement that framework 
violated the fundamental rights of Pakistani citizens. 
There, the existing policy framework provided 
the basis both for evaluating the lawfulness of 
government action (or, more accurately, inaction) 
and for specifying a remedy (the full and expedient 
implementation of the framework).
3.2.5 Hybrid Approaches: Duty of Care and Public 
Trust
Some sources of legal rights and obligations 
incorporate constitutional, common law and 
statutory elements. For example, in Urgenda, the 
Hague District Court found that the government 
must “do more to avert the imminent danger caused 
by climate change” because it owed its citizens a 
“duty of care to protect and improve the living 
environment.”136 This duty was codified in the Dutch 
constitution, but a similar duty also exists in common 
law, as the concept of “negligence” is typically 
defined as a breach of the duty of due care owed to 
136  Urgenda, at 1 (summary)
South Africa
South Africa’s High Court was recently asked 
to determine whether, under the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, 
“relevant” considerations for environmental 
review of plans for the 1200 megawatt, coal-fired 
Thabametsi Power Project include the project’s 
impacts on the global climate and the impacts 
of a changing climate on the project. Notably, 
the project would operate until about 2060. The 
court, after observing that the statute does not 
expressly contemplate climate change, held that 
such considerations are nonetheless relevant and 
that their absence from the environmental review 
of the project made its approval unlawful. The 
court cited several reasons, including South Africa’s 
commitments under the Paris Agreement, for its 
conclusion that climate change is indeed a relevant 
consideration for the environmental review of the 
Thabametsi Project. Because the review approved 
by the Minister of Environmental Affairs effectively 
ignored climate change, the court held it to be 
legally invalid. 
This case will likely have substantive as well as 
procedural significance. By holding that at least some 
South African environmental reviews conducted 
pursuant to the 1998 National Environmental 
Management Act must consider climate change 
and its impacts, the court has not only declared 
those factors “relevant” to environmental reviews 
but—owing to South Africa’s commitments under 
the Paris Agreement and Marrakech Accord—has 
also created a substantive hurdle that may prevent 
the Department of Environmental Affairs from 
authorizing a project found to have significant and 
adverse climate impacts.
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another person. The court explicitly recognized this 
link, noting that it must consider whether there had 
been an “unlawful hazardous negligence on the part 
of the State” to determine whether the State had 
breached its duty. 
The approach adopted in Urgenda can be and is 
being adapted to other jurisdictions that have 
also imposed a “duty of care” on government 
actors. Indeed, litigants have filed a similar case in 
Sweden, PUSH Sweden, Nature & Youth Sweden, et al. v. 
Government of Sweden, which alleges that the national 
government has breached its duty of care towards 
the citizens by allowing a state-owned company 
to divest from (rather than decommissioning) coal 
mining and coal power assets. The complaint notes 
that “[t]he scope of the duty of care is determined by 
a combination of considerations such as Sweden’s 
accession to international conventions, nationally 
adopted environmental goals, environmental 
legislation, [and] government statutes”137 as well as 
the Swedish constitution.138
The use of the public trust doctrine can also be 
thought of as a hybrid approach to litigation: it is 
primarily a common law doctrine, but it may also be 
137  Id. para. 95.
138  Id. para. 92.
informed by constitutional and statutory provisions 
– for example, constitutional provisions requiring 
the government to protect or manage resources in 
the public interest. Through the Our Children’s Trust 
litigation, several suits have alleged that failure to 
mitigate climate change breaches government’s 
duty under the public trust doctrine. Public trust 
claims have also been filed in Pakistan, Philippines, 
and Ukraine. (See Section 2.2.5.)
3.3 Remedies/Targets
The cases discussed in the preceding sections, 
and profiled in the next, illustrate that global 
climate change litigation in some instances seeks 
conventional remedies, but in others seeks remedies 
of a dramatically unconventional scale and scope. 
The conventional remedies include declaratory 
judgments on the legality of contested actions or 
inactions, injunctions to undertake certain actions 
or to halt others, and the imposition of liability and 
award of damages for harms suffered by plaintiffs.139 
Unconventional remedies include injunctions aimed 
at changing basic features of national energy and 
transportation policy.140 
139  See, e.g., Lliuya v. RWE AG.
140  See, e.g., Urgenda, Ali v. Republic of Pakistan.
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Litigation has emerged as an important feature 
of ongoing efforts to promote climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. This owes in 
large part to the growing number of national laws 
that address climate change directly and so provide 
toeholds for litigants seeking to hold governments 
and private actors to account for obligations to 
mitigate or adapt. It also owes to the cohering 
role played by the Paris Agreement, which puts 
national laws and policies into a global context and 
thereby enables litigants to construe governments’ 
commitments and actions as being adequate 
or inadequate. As climate change litigation has 
proliferated, it has addressed a widening scope of 
activities, ranging from coastal development to 
infrastructure planning to resource extraction—in 
effect tracing through legal efforts the long and 
varied list of ways in which climate change affects 
ecosystems, societies, and individuals’ rights and 
interests. It has also encountered a growing list of 
legal issues, such as the causal showing required to 
establish liability and the relevance of the public trust 
doctrine to governments’ approaches to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. In addition to 
proliferating, climate change litigation also seems 
to be growing in ambition and effectiveness: cases 
across the world provide examples of litigants 
holding governments to account for the actions or 
inactions that bear upon those litigants’ rights amid 
changes to weather and coastlines. 
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